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ANIMATING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN CONTEMPORARY 
PLAINTIFFS’ LITIGATION:  THE RULE, OR THE EXCEPTION? 
Cory Tischbein* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has long proclaimed plaintiffs’ Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury1 to be a “fundamental guarantee of 
the rights and liberties of the people.”2  Deeming the “justly dear”3 
right “an object of deep interest and solicitude,”4 the Court has con-
sistently declared that “every encroachment upon it has been watched 
with great jealousy”5 and “should be scrutinized with the utmost 
care.”6  Given that the right’s “deprivation at the hands of the English 
was one of the important grievances leading to the break with Eng-
land,”7 holding the constitutional right to trial by jury in such high es-
teem is sensible. 
However, civil procedural innovations allegedly sharing a nebu-
lous relationship with the right have pervaded federal courts in re-
cent years.  Scholars and litigants have raised concerns that, in prac-
tice, many popular procedural innovations—the motion to dismiss, 
summary judgment, and remittitur among them8—preclude affected 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”). 
 2 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 378 (1913). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
 7 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 8 See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amend-
ment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 734 (2003) (“[R]emittitur in fact does impinge the plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial and is thus unconstitutional.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dis-
miss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1890 (2008) (“The motion to dismiss is 
fast becoming the new summary judgment motion and with this movement, the civil jury 
trial continues to disappear.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 
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plaintiffs from exercising their Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury.  Two such procedural innovations have come to dominate the 
landscape of plaintiffs’ actions:  binding individual arbitration under 
the Federal Arbitration Act9 (“FAA”) and multidistrict litigation 
(“MDL”).  However, their relationships to the trial-by-jury right have 
received a modicum of scholarly focus and have gone unaddressed by 
the Supreme Court. 
Arbitral actions under the FAA have evolved from a dispute reso-
lution method utilized by “sophisticated business entities into a phe-
nomenon that pervades the contemporary economy.”10  Likewise, the 
current volume of MDL in the federal courts is staggering and shows 
no sign of abatement, as a third of all pending federal civil cases are 
part of an MDL.11  Accordingly, both procedures are more prominent 
now than ever before. 
Undebatably, both are formally consistent with the Seventh 
Amendment’s command that plaintiffs be afforded an opportunity to 
be heard by a jury.  In FAA-supported arbitration actions, claimants 
are thought to be subject to arbitral proceedings and consequently 
forfeit their trial-by-jury right only where they knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently consent to do so.  Likewise, in MDL, similarly situat-
ed plaintiffs asserting comparable legal claims have their pretrial pro-
ceedings centralized before one federal district court and are sup-
posedly remanded to their separate courts of origin for individual 
trials by jury at the close of MDL’s centralized pretrial proceedings. 
However, whether these procedures actually afford plaintiffs an 
opportunity to exercise their right to trial by jury in practice is an un-
examined, more uncertain prospect.  Given that form and practice 
are often dissimilar, and that these two procedures dominate con-
temporary plaintiffs’ actions, the issue cries out for analysis.  Accord-
ingly, this Comment evaluates whether FAA-supported arbitration 
and MDL are practically consistent with plaintiffs’ abilities to exercise 
their right to trial by jury, analyzing the relationship between the sub-
stance of the constitutional right, plaintiffs’ practical ability to exer-
cise the right, FAA-supported arbitration, MDL, and the Supreme 
Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.  This analysis not only 
 
93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139–40 (2007)  (“[N]o procedure similar to summary judgment exist-
ed under the English common law and . . . summary judgment violates the core princi-
ples or ‘substance’ of the English common law.”). 
 9 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–08, 301–07 (1925). 
 10 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging and the Evolution of 
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1420 (2008). 
 11 See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance:  Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Lit-
igation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 762 (2013). 
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affords us a glimpse of the on-the-ground realities facing plaintiffs 
seeking to exercise their Seventh Amendment right and a compre-
hensive understanding of the Court’s conception of this right, but, 
more importantly, enables us to determine if these procedures have 
“relegat[ed] the Seventh Amendment to insignificant words on a 
page.”12 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the FAA-supported 
arbitration and MDL processes.  Part II sketches the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the trial-by-jury right, explicating its meaning and 
application to prospective consumer and mass tort plaintiffs—the 
plaintiffs primarily impacted by FAA-supported arbitration and MDL.  
Parts III and IV focus on the on-the-ground realities facing prospec-
tive consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs, which this Comment ar-
gues practically preclude them from exercising their Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury.  Part V demonstrates the extraordi-
narily permissive and formalistic nature of the Supreme Court’s Sev-
enth Amendment trial-by-jury jurisprudence, which this Comment 
contends is behind the continued vitality of those procedures that are 
formally, but not practically, consistent with plaintiffs’ right to trial by 
jury.  Finally, Part VI, contends that, in light of its prior jurispruden-
tial failings, the Court should resume an active role in the field of 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by affording the constitutional 
right an operative, consequential meaning.  The Court’s continued 
failure to appropriately protect or define the right not only contra-
venes the aims of the Framers, but also threatens the litigant and so-
cietal interests that the Seventh Amendment is thought to protect. 
I.  THE FAA AND MDL:  AN OVERVIEW 
A.  The FAA 
Enacted in 1925 to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to 
place arbitration13 agreements “upon the same footing as other con-
 
 12 Peter A. Arhangelsky, Nullifying the Constitution:  Federal Asbestos Tort Reform and the Abroga-
tion of Seventh Amendment Rights, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 121 (2006) (citing Granfinan-
ciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989)). 
 13 In arbitration, the parties present their case to a presumably neutral third-party decision-
maker rather than to a judge or jury, removing the resolution of the dispute from the 
court system altogether.  See Brian D. Weber, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury Trial—
Another Option, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 717, 726–27 (2006) (explaining arbitration’s mechan-
ics).  The arbitrator renders a decision, which is typically final and binding on both par-
ties.  See id. at 727 (citing Gregory T. Alvarez & Nancy J. Arencibia, Is Arbitration Right for 
Your Company?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2002, at 46).  Arbitrators’ decisions are rarely ap-
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tracts,”14 the FAA authorizes federal courts to enter orders to compel 
arbitration, suspend judicial proceedings brought by parties opposing 
arbitration, and enforce arbitration awards.15  Applicable to contracts, 
adhesive16 and otherwise, involving interstate and maritime com-
merce, the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements within 
these contracts will be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,”17 like any 
other valid contractual provision.  As scholars began shedding light 
on the perceived benefits of arbitration over litigation—primarily ar-
bitration’s propensity to resolve disputes at quicker and cheaper rates 
than litigation, diminish the risk of disclosure of confidential infor-
mation, and preserve the parties’ relationships—Congress passed the 
FAA to cement the enforceability of arbitration agreements and 
combat the judiciary’s hostility toward arbitration.18 
When it became apparent that the FAA solidified the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements, corporations responded in kind.  In 
most of their adhesive consumer contracts, corporations began em-
ploying arbitration clauses barring consumers from both resolving 
 
pealed to a judge and only in a scant few cases where arbitrators engaged in serious mis-
conduct are their decisions overturned.  See id. (citing Alvarez & Arencibia, supra). 
 14 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
 15 See Adam. M. Kepper, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:  Using the Public 
Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver Clauses Than for Arbitration 
Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345, 1352–53 (2006) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–54, 11, 13) (explain-
ing the FAA’s impact on judicial treatment of arbitration clauses). 
 16 Adhesive contracts are agreements in which one side has all the bargaining power and 
uses it to write the contract to his advantage.  See Sierra David Sterkin,  Challenging Adhe-
sion Contracts in California:  A Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 285–86 
(2004) (citing Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1961)) (de-
tailing the characteristics of adhesive contracts).  A prime example of an adhesive con-
tract is a standardized contract form that offers services to consumers on an essentially 
“take it or leave it” basis without giving consumers realistic opportunities to negotiate 
terms to further their interests.  See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 
(N.M. 2008) (citing Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 1985)) (ex-
plaining the typical characteristics of adhesive contracts). 
 17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 18 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 77–78  (2008) (citing Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and 
Forum Accessibility:  Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 826, 840 (2008)) (dis-
cussing the reasons arbitration is favored); Scott R. Swier, The Tenuous Tale of the Terrible 
Termites:  The Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s Decision to Interpret Section Two in the 
Broadest Possible Manner:  Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 131, 131 (1996) (“Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act . . . to reverse the 
trend of American courts which were, at the time, reluctant to recognize arbitration pro-
visions as legally binding agreements.” (citing Stephen P. Bedell et al., The McMahon 
Mandate:  Compulsory Arbitration of Securities and RICO Claims, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2–3 
(1987))). 
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disputes arising out of the contract in the courts and aggregating 
their claims in arbitration.19 
In effect, these arbitration agreements—which are known as arbi-
tration clauses and class arbitration waivers, respectively, and, thanks 
to the FAA, are almost always enforced by the courts—compel affect-
ed consumers seeking to resolve a dispute to relinquish the right to 
participate in litigation or class-based arbitration.  This leaves these 
consumers with the sole option of individual arbitration, even when 
thousands or millions of claims by similarly situated consumers repli-
cate the individual claim.20  Accordingly, courts view the “loss of the 
right to a jury trial . . . [as] a necessary and fairly obvious conse-
quence of an agreement to arbitrate.”21 
Corporations’ affinities for arbitration clauses and class arbitration 
waivers are unsurprising.  Not only do these provisions protect corpo-
rations from the temporal, financial, and public relations expenses 
attendant to public individual and class-based litigation, but evidence 
suggests that—due to a lack of resources or knowledge, or a fear of 
retaliation—very few consumers will choose to bring individual arbi-
tration claims against a company.22  For instance, affidavits submitted 
in one recent litigation indicated that “[f]ewer than 200 of [the de-
 
 19 See Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 669 (2011) (“Once it became clear that these adhesive arbitra-
tion clauses would be treated as binding, corporations widely added clauses prohibiting 
the aggregation of claims.” (citing Bryan Allen Rice, Enforceable or Not?:  Class Action Waiv-
ers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
215, 224 (2008))); Robert B. Kershaw, Mandatory Binding Arbitration—Goliath’s New Of-
fense, 36 MD. B.J. 28, 30 (2003) (“[C]orporate parties have widely incorporated mandatory 
binding arbitration clauses in virtually every conceivable type of contract that could sup-
port a class action claim.”). 
 20 See Steven D. Millman, Catching the Waive:  The Third Circuit Joins the Growing Trend of Cir-
cuit Courts in Voiding a Class-Arbitration Waiver in Homa v. American Express Co., 55 VILL. 
L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2010) (“A class-arbitration waiver relinquishes the right to participate 
in class-wide arbitration or to aggregate claims with others in any form of . . . arbitral pro-
ceeding.” (quoting Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total De-
mise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 376 n.15 (2005)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:  
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 
1191–92, 1234 (2001) (“In addition to losing consumer rights in arbitration, consumers 
lose the traditional remedies that are allowed by the judicial system.” (citing Powertel, 
Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999))). 
 21 Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 22 See Nicholas Roxborough & Donna Puyot, Dispelling Some Myths About Arbitration, 34 L.A. 
LAW. 44, 44 (2011) (“[C]orporations would prefer to have arbitration clauses in boiler-
plate consumer contracts, in the belief that these clauses result in the more efficient and 
less costly resolution of litigation.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami:  AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (2012) (discussing the rea-
sons behind corporations’ affinity for arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers). 
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fendant’s] millions of customers brought claims in individual arbitra-
tion against the company for any reason, compared to thousands who 
sought help from a consumer group”23 concerning their claims 
against the defendant in that litigation. 
Accordingly, today, arbitration clauses containing class arbitration 
waivers pervade employment, insurance, and franchise contracts, but 
are particularly omnipresent in consumer contracts.24  In fact, more 
than seventy-five percent of contemporary consumer contracts have 
been found to contain arbitration clauses, usually coupled with class 
arbitration waivers.25  Consequently, a substantial majority of prospec-
tive consumer actions26 are subject to FAA-supported arbitration 
clauses and class arbitration waivers.27 
By calling for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and 
thus preventing affected consumers from being heard by a jury, the 
FAA’s relationship to the jury trial guarantee is, upon first glance, a 
troubled one.  As further analysis reveals, a substantial majority of 
consumers, by virtue of their subjection to FAA-supported arbitration 
clauses and class arbitration waivers, are practically precluded from 
ever exercising their right to have their individual or class-based legal 
actions heard by a jury.  Consequently, the FAA’s relationship to the 
jury trial right is a deeply troubled one. 
 
 23 Sternlight, supra note 22, at 723 (quoting Brief for Marygrace Coneff et al. as Amici Curi-
ae Supporting Respondents, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) 
(No. 09-893), at 9). 
 24 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical Study of Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–83 
(2008) (“Over 75% of the consumer agreements we examined included mandatory arbi-
tration clauses.”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for 
Peers:  A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 
118, 119 (2008) (“[I]n our sample, mandatory arbitration clauses appeared in more than 
three-quarters of consumer contracts . . . .”); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty 
Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 635 (2008) (“All 
nine of the biggest cell phone service providers’ consumer form contracts I examined in-
cluded [arbitration clauses] . . . . [A]nd all nine of the contracts barred consumers’ access 
to class relief.”). 
 25 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 26 These include breach of contract, product-liability-based tort, and unreasonable charges 
claims against credit card companies, commercial banks, manufacturers, and service pro-
viders. 
 27 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Gilles, supra note 20, at 375 (“[C]ontract-based 
class actions are . . . on their way to Mauritius.  Corporate caretakers have concocted an 
antigen, in the form of the class action waiver provision, that travels through contractual 
relationships and dooms the class action device . . . the waiver works in tandem with 
standard arbitration provisions to ensure that any claim against the corporate defendant 
may be asserted only in a one-on-one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding.”). 
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Although the right to trial by jury is just that—a waivable right and 
not a requirement—the courts’ interpretations of the FAA, as de-
tailed in the following sections, call for the enforcement of these arbi-
tration agreements even when plaintiffs’ jury trial waiver is not “know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent.”28  Accordingly, the FAA gives ample 
cause for serious constitutional concern. 
B.  The MDL Process 
MDL was born out of the sort of massive litigation whose pretrial 
proceedings it is aimed at centralizing.  In the late 1960s, the federal 
government successfully litigated myriad antitrust suits against elec-
trical equipment manufacturers, and, subsequently, more than 1800 
separate damages actions were filed against the manufacturers in 
thirty-three federal district courts.29  This “unprecedented state of af-
fairs”30 led legislators and judges to recognize the need for a more ef-
ficient means of administering the parallel pretrial proceedings at-
tendant to such massive litigation.31  Thus, in 1968, § 1407 of Title 28 
was enacted, creating the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(“JPML”).32 
The JPML “is neither a trial, appellate, nor (as some have called 
it) a . . . ‘Super Court.’”33  It is a special judicial creature comprised of 
seven federal judges empowered to transfer civil actions individually 
filed around the country “involving one or more common questions 
of fact”34 to a single district court, the transferee court, for coordinat-
ed, centralized pretrial proceedings when the transfer would “pro-
mote the just and efficient conduct”35 of the action. 
Formally, MDL only impacts the pretrial stages of plaintiffs’ cases; 
by limiting the application of § 1407 to “pretrial proceedings,” Con-
 
 28 Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment 
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 732–33 (2001). 
 29 See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 31 (1991)  
(citing H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., 90TH CONG., REP. NO. 1130, 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899) (detailing MDL’s birth). 
 30 Bradt, supra note 11, at 785 (citing DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 2.2 
(1986)). 
 31 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 785–86 (citing HERR, supra note 30)); George E. Farrell, Mul-
tidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 159, 159 (1972) (discussing 
MDL’s origins); Resnik, supra note 29, at 31–32 (citing Neal & Goldberg, supra note 29, at 
623–25) (same). 
 32 See Farrell, supra note 31, at 159; Resnik, supra note 29, at 34–35. 
 33 Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of Motion Practice Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, 175 F.R.D. 589, 589 (1998). 
 34 Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). 
 35 Id. 
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gress designed JPML to transfer and centralize only those proceed-
ings that precede trial.36  Accordingly, at the close of pretrial proceed-
ings, individual cases are, in theory, remanded for trial to the districts 
from which they originated.37 
The MDL process is most commonly employed to centralize the 
pretrial proceedings attendant to “mass torts,” a label referring to 
“tortious conduct affecting a large number of persons and giving rise 
to latent injury.”38  Since their emergence in 1974, mass torts have be-
come the principal aspect of federal civil litigation; by 1990, they en-
compassed seventy-five percent of all new federal product liability fil-
ings and, by 2000, many jurisdictions reported that mass torts 
exceeded twenty-five percent of their entire civil caseloads.39  Conse-
quently, the federal courts—MDL and otherwise—have been flooded 
with a “rising tide of mass tort filings”40; as Chief Judge Scirica rightly 
observed, “It’s asbestos.  It’s breast implants.  It’s fen-phen.”41 
Securing MDL transfer is not a challenging task for mass tort liti-
gants.  MDL’s “common questions of fact” requirement is lax, and, to 
authorize transfer, the panel need only find that transfer will “be for 
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the 
just and efficient conduct of such actions.”42  MDL transfer can be ini-
tiated by motion by any party to a litigation, or sua sponte by the 
JPML, and the consent of the parties to the litigation is neither re-
quired nor recommended.43  In fact, MDL transfer may even occur 
when all parties agree concerning the merits of transfer, and the 
 
 36 See Farrell, supra note 31, at 166 (discussing MDL’s design). 
 37 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action . . . shall be remanded . . . before the conclusion of 
such pretrial proceedings . . . .”). 
 38 Joseph R. Barton, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts:  What Do the Constitu-
tion and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 201 (1999) 
(citing Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 
296 n.1 (1996)); See also Bradt, supra note 11, at 762 (“[A] third of all pending federal civ-
il cases are part of an MDL . . . [and] over ninety percent of those cases are [a form of 
mass tort] . . . .” (citing Lee et al., supra note 11, at 2)). 
 39 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1343, 1363 (1995) (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves:  
What’s Going on in the Civil Liability System?, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 139, 147 (1993)) (detailing the 
striking proliferation of mass torts); Karen A. Geduldig, Casey at the Bat:  Judicial Treatment 
of Mass Tort Litigation, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 309–10 (2000) (citing Hensler, supra, at 
147) (same). 
 40 Michael Higgins, Mass Tort Makeover?, 84 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 41 Id. 
 42 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Bradt, supra note 11, at  786 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407) (detail-
ing the mechanics of MDL transfer). 
 43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (discussing methods of transfer). 
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JPML may order transfer despite any pertinent infirmities in the par-
ties’ transfer motions and briefs.44 
Accordingly, although § 1407(a) provides that transfer may only 
occur where the JPML decides that transfer will be convenient for the 
parties, the JPML conducts transfer hearings with an eye toward judi-
cial economy and efficiency, ordering transfer where doing so would 
reduce court dockets and costs, sometimes in the face of opposition 
by all parties.45 
More often than not, when faced with a motion for MDL transfer, 
or considering one sua sponte, the JPML orders centralization; from 
2003 to 2008, for instance, the percentage of cases transferred to an 
MDL court of those considered for such transfer ranged from seven-
ty-two to eighty-six percent.46 
Once a case is transferred, the control of the case is out of the 
hands of the JPML and is instead in the control of the transferee 
judge, the “MDL judge.”  The MDL judge’s authority over pretrial 
proceedings is quite broad, ranging from coordinating discovery47 to 
ruling on motions to remand48 and dispositive motions.49  Most im-
portantly, the MDL judge has the power to govern the settlement of 
the cases before it.50 
 
 44 See Farrell, supra note 31, at 164 (“When consideration is opposed by all the parties, it 
should not be required.  Occasionally, however, the Panel has taken the opposite position 
when plaintiffs and defendants agreed that consolidation was not required . . . .” (citing 
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No. M.D.L.—64 
(J.P.M.L. 1971))); Kyle, supra note 33, at 597 n.51, 599–600 (“[T]he Panel may, sua spon-
te consider and order transfer, despite any infirmities in a brief, or whether a motion or 
brief is submitted at all . . . . The Panel considers even unopposed transfer motions on 
their merits, and has occasionally denied unopposed transfer motions.” (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(c)(i))). 
 45 See Farrell, supra note 31, at 164 (“Occasionally, however, the Panel has [ordered consoli-
dation despite opposition from all parties] . . . .” (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at New 
Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No. M.D.L.—64 (J.P.M.L. 1971))); Kyle, supra note 
33, at 590 (“Panel 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfer orders . . . are meant to achieve efficiency and 
judicial economy . . . .” (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 10.1 
(1995))). 
 46 See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel:  Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 
2229 (2008) (detailing MDL transfer statistics). 
 47 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 238 F. Supp. 2d 
270 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering production of documents at deposition). 
 48 See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (resolving motion to remand). 
 49 See, e.g., In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 277 
(D. Mass. 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment). 
 50 See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2003) 
(“[S]ettlement matters are appropriate pretrial proceedings subject to centralization un-
der [28 U.S.C.] § 1407.” (citing In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 142–44 (3d Cir. 2000))). 
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Once part of an MDL, individual plaintiffs retain almost no con-
trol over their cases.  The MDL judge establishes a Plaintiffs Man-
agement Committee (“PMC”) responsible for a range of manage-
ment functions, such as arguing motions, coordinating discovery, and 
negotiating settlement.51  Unsurprisingly, these PMCs often come un-
der fire for exhibiting conflicts of interests and attempting to impose 
inadequate settlements on plaintiffs.52 
Plaintiffs before an MDL court are practically out of luck if they 
endeavor to escape, as the JPML retains “unusually broad discretion 
to carry out its functions, including substantial authority . . . to decide 
how the cases under its jurisdiction should be coordinated.”53  Ac-
cordingly, appeal of a panel decision to transfer rarely occurs, and is 
available only by petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.54 
The idea underlying MDL transfer is a sensible one.  If mass torts 
are crowding court dockets, then it would “seem sensible to resolve 
the claims as efficiently as possible and to reduce the transaction costs 
in doing so”55 through transfer.  The other appeals of transfer are 
clear:  thousands of claims can be resolved at once, while incurring 
minimal transaction costs, and the resolution of those claims furnish-
es valuable reference points for the resolutions of other claims as 
well.56 
Although more than four decades old, the MDL statute is now 
more prominent than ever.  A third of all currently pending federal 
civil cases are part of an MDL, and more than ninety percent of those 
cases are a form of mass tort.57  Many of these MDLs are massive, 
comprising thousands of claims and litigants, with billions of dollars 
 
 51 See ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 14:32 
(3d ed. 2012) (discussing PMCs’ functions). 
 52 See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Products Liab. Litig., Objectors Claim Settlement a Sham Benefitting On-
ly AHP, Lawyers, 15 NO. 12 ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG. REP. 12, at *2 (May 2000) 
(“The . . . objectors also charge . . . [the PMC and its attorneys] entered into a contract 
with AHP beforehand that severely limits how they can represent their clients . . . .”). 
 53 In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 173 (3rd Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 811–
12 (3rd Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 See Heyburn, supra note 46, at 2228–29 (citing In re Wilson, 451 F.3d at 161, 163–64) 
(tracing the JPML’s development as a manager of complex litigation disputes). 
 55 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases:  Consolidation 
Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed by 
the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 280 (2003). 
 56 See id. at 281 (citing The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999:  Hearing on H.R. 1283 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 187 (1999) (statement of William N. 
Eskridge Jr., Professor, Yale Law School)) (explaining the benefits engendered by MDL). 
 57 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 762 (citing Lee et al., supra note 11 (discussing MDL’s role in 
contemporary complex litigation). 
Oct. 2013] ANIMATING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 243 
 
in liability claims at stake.58  It is thus no wonder that judges and 
scholars deem MDL the “primary vehicle for the resolution of com-
plex civil cases.”59 
Corresponding temporally with the rise of mass torts and the de-
velopment of MDL is the last several decades’ marked decline in the 
rate of federal tort cases resolved by jury trials:  an approximately sev-
enty-eight percent decline between 1985 and 2003, from 3600 to 800 
federal tort jury trials nationally.60  Many scholars—who aptly describe 
our civil jury system as “dying”61 and “all but disappeared”62—predict 
that if this “historic decline”63 continues, tort jury trials may soon be-
come extinct.64  This may not disturb those who hail MDL for its not-
ed efficiency and economic benefits, but it is problematic in light of 
James Madison’s proclamation that “[t]rial by jury in civil cases 
is . . . essential to secure the liberty of the people.”65  As explained in 
the following sections, mass tort MDL plaintiffs have been afforded a 
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury that, in practice, the MDL 
process precludes them from exercising. 
 
 58 See Charles Silver & Geoffrey C. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multidis-
trict Litigations:  Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108 (2010) (“[T]he biggest 
[MDLs] involv[e] tens of thousands of plaintiffs with billions of dollars in liability claims.” 
(citing In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3rd Cir. 2002))). 
 59 Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324 
(2008) (citing In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 60 See ALAN KANNER, DAUBERT AND THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL 38 (2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1851 (citing Leonard Post, Federal Tort Trials Con-
tinue Downward Spiral, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 7) (noting the decline of federal jury 
trials). 
 61 Justice Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials:  What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 
191, 192 (2005) (quoting William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. 
LAW., July 2003, at *32 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Id. (quoting Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 142 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63 Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.?  Can it Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 795, 812 (2009) (quoting Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64 See, e.g., id. at 797 (“If the trend continues . . . civil jury trials in America may eventually 
become, for all practical purposes, extinct.”); Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digi-
tal Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 693 (2005) (“[C]ivil jury trials are basically 
dead . . . .”). 
 65 Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005) 
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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II.  THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT’S 
TRIAL-BY-JURY GUARANTEE 
A.  The Meaning of the Seventh Amendment 
Valued for its emphasis on common sense, empowerment of the 
common people, and check upon the power of the sovereign and the 
judge, the jury trial right has been recognized as a critical aspect of 
our governmental structure since the Founding.66  As Justice Story 
famously proclaimed, “[the right of trial by jury] . . . is . . . the palla-
dium of our public rights and liberties.”67  This principle still rings 
true today; as the Seventh Circuit recently explained, “[i]t is a fun-
damental principle of American law that every person is entitled to 
his or her day in court.”68 
Although we have scant direct evidence concerning the intention 
of the Framers of the Seventh Amendment, the founding generation 
clearly intended for us to “do justice with juries.”69  When Thomas Jef-
ferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, he “observed that a 
‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind’ required those in rebel-
lion to ‘declare the causes’ that impelled them to separation, includ-
ing England’s ‘depriving us . . . of the benefits of Trial by Jury.’”70  
When Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he likewise centered it 
around jury trials in civil cases, resulting in the Seventh Amend-
ment.71 
Outwardly, the Court has maintained the Seventh Amendment’s 
importance, proclaiming it to be “of such importance and [to] oc-
cup[y] so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized 
with the utmost care.”72  To date, however, the Court has “artfully 
avoided any pronouncement of what substantive jury functions are 
 
 66 See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay:  The Constitutional Boundaries of Ex-
pert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 865 (2008) (“In civil cases, the preservation of the 
jury right was viewed at the time of the founding as almost equally critical to the preserva-
tion of liberty and democracy.” (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1762 (1833))). 
 67 Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 687 (2004) (quoting John C. Hogan, Joseph Story on Juries, 37 OR. L. 
REV. 234, 249 (1958)). 
 68 Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 69 Furgeson, supra note 63, at 798. 
 70 See id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 20 (U.S. 1776)). 
 71 See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII). 
 72 Arhangelsky, supra note 12, at 98  (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
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‘preserved’”73 by the constitutional right to trial by jury in civil cases.  
The Court’s scant holdings regarding jury functions have thus far 
spoken exclusively to procedure:  disputed questions of fact must be 
submitted to the jury;74 unanimity of verdict is required;75 the jury 
must be so constituted as to be an impartial and competent tribunal;76 
and a jury of six is constitutionally permissible.77 
Nonetheless, despite its evasiveness in the area of substantive jury 
functions, the Court has established a historical approach through 
which it not only evaluates the constitutionality of a procedure impli-
cating the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee, but also determines 
whether an action affords plaintiffs a right to a jury trial.78 
Because the “common law” referenced in the Seventh Amend-
ment refers to the common law of England in 1791, the year the Sev-
enth Amendment was enacted, a new procedure affecting the jury 
trial right will be constitutional under the Seventh Amendment only 
if the procedure satisfies the “substance” of the “English common law 
when the Amendment was adopted.”79  The Court’s explication of the 
substance of the English common law jury trial in 1791 is sparse:  “is-
sues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be 
determined by the jury . . . .”80  Accordingly, this proclamation is our 
sole tool for defining the substance of the English common law jury 
trial and, consequently, the Seventh Amendment’s substantive re-
quirements. 
The Court’s historical approach only calls for the preservation of 
the substance of the common law jury trial, not “mere matters of 
form or procedure.”81  Thus, new procedural modifications to the jury 
trial are permissible so long as they leave intact the substance of the 
English common law trial.82  Under this approach, the Court has up-
 
 73 Paul B. Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform:  Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989). 
 74 See id. (citing Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1885)). 
 75 See id. (citing Am. Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)). 
 76 See Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial By Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 
669, 674 (1918) (detailing the substance of the Seventh Amendment trial-by-jury right). 
 77 See Weiss, supra note 73 (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973)). 
 78 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344  (“[T]he content of the right 
must be judged by historical standards.”) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 
(1974)). 
 79 Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). 
 80 Id. (citing Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)). 
 81 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 346 (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657). 
 82 See id. (“[T]o sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the province of the jury 
to a greater degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of 
the Seventh Amendment.” (citing Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 
(1967))). 
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held many procedural innovations without controversy:  directed ver-
dicts,83 partial new trials on separable legal issues,84 judgments not-
withstanding the verdict,85 and summary judgment.86 
Finally, under this approach, a modern plaintiff is guaranteed a 
jury trial if the plaintiff’s claim would have been actionable, or is 
analogous to a claim that would have been,87 in a 1791 English com-
mon law court.88  Courts refer to such jury-right-affording actions as 
actions “at law.”89  An action was one “at law” in 1791 if it was one “in 
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-
distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized.”90  
Importantly, when an action is one purely for monetary damages—
which are, by definition, “legal” damages—the action is always one at 
law and, therefore, “the determination of damages must fall to a ju-
ry.”91 
B.  Prospective Consumer and Mass Tort MDL Plaintiffs Retain a Seventh 
Amendment Right to Trial by Jury 
Under this prevailing historical approach, the Seventh Amend-
ment clearly guarantees prospective consumer and individual mass 
tort MDL plaintiffs the right to a jury trial.  Each of these plaintiffs is 
asserting, or seeking to assert, a basic contract or tort claim against 
the defendant for monetary damages, and juries were impaneled for 
such actions at common law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment 
was enacted. 
 
 83 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (holding that directed verdict is con-
sistent with the Seventh Amendment). 
 84 See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (upholding the 
partial new trial on a separable legal issue against a Seventh Amendment challenge). 
 85 See Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 654 (holding that judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is constitutional under a Seventh Amendment analysis). 
 86 See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902) (holding that summary judg-
ment is consistent with the Seventh Amendment). 
 87 The Court has neglected to explain what, exactly, it deems a claim “analogous” to one at 
common law.  However, in making this determination, the Court focuses on “the nature 
of the issue to be tried.”  Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (citing Simler v. 
Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963)). 
 88 See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (“By common law . . . [the Fram-
ers] meant . . . suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in con-
tradistinction to those . . . [in which] equitable remedies were administered . . . .” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
 89 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,  43 (1989). 
 90 Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974) (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447). 
 91 Arhangelsky, supra note 12, at 114 (citing Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 
71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991)). 
Oct. 2013] ANIMATING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 247 
 
Contract-law-based legal actions for monetary damages tried be-
fore juries were ubiquitous at common law.92  Identifying a common 
law legal cause of action identical or analogous to the contract law 
claims seeking monetary damages asserted by nearly all prospective 
consumer plaintiffs is therefore an unchallenging task.  Accordingly, 
prospective consumer plaintiffs asserting contract-based actions for 
monetary damages retain a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. 
Given that the origin of trial by jury of tort actions for monetary 
damages against private parties at English common law dates to as 
early as the fifteenth century, such tort actions, too, were ubiquitous 
in the English common law court system.93  Consequently, finding a 
common law legal cause of action identical or analogous to the claims 
asserted by mass tort MDL plaintiffs and many prospective consumer 
plaintiffs subject to the FAA, as the historical approach mandates, is 
easily realized:  mass tort MDL and many consumer plaintiffs are 
likewise seeking to assert tort claims for monetary damages.94 
The fact that the class action device alters the form in which many 
individual prospective consumer plaintiffs would ultimately arrive be-
fore a jury has no effect on the underlying legal action’s nature as 
one sounding in contract or, at times, tort for monetary relief and, as 
a result, garnering Seventh Amendment protection.  Likewise, that 
MDL alters the way mass tort plaintiffs would ultimately arrive before 
a jury does not modify the underlying nature of the legal action as 
one sounding in tort for monetary relief and, consequently, receiving 
Seventh Amendment protection.  The Court has consistently held 
that “nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the proce-
dural devices by which the parties happen to come before the 
court.”95  Accordingly, regardless of the procedural innovation being 
employed, where the underlying actions are legal, the Seventh 
Amendment affords the plaintiffs a right to trial by jury.96  Thus, by 
 
 92 See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA:  Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Action, 25 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 361, 376 n.88 (1992) (citing JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 285–87 (2d ed. 1979)) (explaining why plaintiffs asserting contractual ac-
tions for monetary damages retain a Seventh Amendment right). 
 93 See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASE AND 
MATERIALS 1–5 (10th ed. 2000) (detailing the origins of tort actions). 
 94 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 311 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]ort actions for 
monetary damages are a prototypical example of an action at law, to which the Seventh 
Amendment applies.” (quoting Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 112) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
 95 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970). 
 96 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 311 (“[C]lass action plaintiffs may obtain a jury trial on any legal 
issues they present . . . .” (quoting Ross, 396 U.S. at 541) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
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virtue of their assertion of legal claims, mass tort MDL plaintiffs and 
prospective consumer plaintiffs retain a constitutional right to trial by 
jury. 
The Court has not yet decided a case concerning the relationship 
between the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, the im-
pact of these FAA-supported, adhesive arbitration clauses and class 
arbitration waivers, and MDL.  Nonetheless, the on-the-ground, prac-
tical realities detailed in the following two Parts suggest that the 
Court recognize that each of these procedural innovations precludes 
affected plaintiffs from exercising their Seventh Amendment right to 
trial by jury. 
III.  THE JUDICIARY’S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA 
PRECLUDES PROSPECTIVE CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS FROM EXERCISING 
THEIR TRIAL-BY-JURY RIGHT 
The FAA’s support for adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbi-
tration waivers is formally consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s 
jury trial guarantee.  However, practically, the federal courts’ inter-
pretations of the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate places adhesive arbi-
tration agreements, arbitration clauses, and class arbitration waivers 
alike, not “upon the same footing as other contracts,”97 but on sacro-
sanct grounds, enabling corporations to use these agreements to bar 
consumers from accessing the courts.  The courts’ jurisprudence 
concerning arbitration agreements illustrates that the courts not only 
abide by a sweeping “federal policy favoring arbitration,”98 but they 
seek to enforce arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers re-
gardless of the specific characteristics of each contract.  The language 
or placement of adhesive arbitration agreements, consumers’ degrees 
of knowledge, education, or sophistication, corporations’ coercive or 
fraudulent tactics in procuring consumers’ consent to these clauses, 
and whether consumers knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently 
agreed to such clauses all drop by the wayside. 
This empowers corporations to, as they do in most of their con-
sumer contracts,99 employ powerful adhesive arbitration agreements 
explicitly locking consumers into individual arbitration, producing 
the “reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her consti-
 
 97 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 98 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 99 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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tutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a 
car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical atten-
tion or gets a job.”100  The striking proliferation of these court-
enforced arbitration agreements has rightly prompted scholars to 
acknowledge the resultant “paradigmatic shift in our civil justice sys-
tem”101 away from the civil jury trial.  Today, the widespread use of 
these adhesive arbitration agreements effectively compels a consumer 
to “yield his or her very access to the courts in order to meaningfully 
participate in our modern society.”102 
While these adhesive arbitration agreements are said to be justi-
fied on the ground that consumers knowingly, voluntarily, and intel-
ligently consent to them, such a justification is not grounded in reali-
ty.103  Consumers have no real opportunity to choose litigation over 
arbitration if they want the often commonplace product or service in 
question. 
Corporations’ propensity to employ such arbitration agreements 
is unsurprising.  These arbitration agreements align perfectly with 
their interests; data show that “blindly agreeing to contract provisions 
is a behavior routinely exhibited by the average consumer,”104 and ev-
idence suggests that—due to a lack of resources and awareness and 
fear of retaliation—“very few consumers will choose to bring individ-
ual arbitration claims against a company.”105  Relatedly, corporations 
are fully cognizant of the courts’ extraordinary deference toward ad-
hesive arbitration agreements.106  Corporate lawyers and business ex-
 
100 Sternlight, supra note 28, at 669 (citing In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1999)). 
101 Judge Craig Smith & Judge Eric Moye, Outsourcing American Civil Justice:  Mandatory Arbi-
tration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 282 
(2012). 
102 Id. (citing Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, The State of the Judiciary in Texas, 70 TEX. B.J. 
314,  315 (Apr. 2007)). 
103 See Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 1997), rejected by Ex parte Perry, 
744 So. 2d 859, 865 (Ala. 1999) (“[An] arbitration agreement is a waiver of a party’s right 
under the Amendment VII of the United States Constitution to a jury trial and, regardless 
of the federal courts’ policy favoring arbitration, we find nothing in the FAA that would 
permit such waiver unless it is made  knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily.”); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1997) (“[C]onsumers and employees are given no real opportunity to choose 
litigation or other dispute-resolution techniques over arbitration.”). 
104 Millman, supra note 20, at 1033 n.1 (citing David. W. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971)). 
105 Sternlight, supra note 22, at 723. 
106 See Gilles, supra note 20, at 395–96 (citing Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7116 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005)); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
 
250 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
ecutives have long been known to regularly share their tactical in-
sights concerning the successes of arbitration agreements “in trade 
journals, at conferences, and in high-level planning sessions.”107 
The rise of this reality has been sped along by the Court’s juris-
prudence in support of its “federal policy favoring arbitration.”108  
Crucially, this jurisprudence has been emphatically enforced by lower 
courts, which construe defenses to agreements to arbitrate particular-
ly narrowly, interpret arbitration agreements especially broadly, and 
regularly mandate individual arbitration in new areas.  These lower 
courts have also felt free to strike state consumer protection statutes 
and disregard the specific conditions of these adhesive arbitration 
agreements:  consumers’ degrees of knowledge and sophistication; 
the clauses’ clarity and conspicuousness; corporate defendants’ coer-
cive or fraudulent tactics in procuring consumers’ “consent” to these 
clauses; and whether consumers agreed to such clauses knowingly, 
voluntarily, or intelligently. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Policy Favoring Arbitration over Litigation 
In 1983, the Supreme Court enunciated a sweeping preference 
for binding arbitration over litigation, supporting and effectively ex-
panding adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers and 
their enforcement, scope, and impact.109  The lower courts’ enforce-
ment of this policy, as detailed in the following section, locks affected 
consumers into binding individual arbitration, precluding them from 
securing a trial by jury, individually or as a class.110 
The Court’s policy favoring arbitration over litigation stems from 
its proclamation in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp. concerning the FAA: 
 
593, 617–18 (2005)) (explaining corporations’ awareness of these agreements and the 
subsequent growth of “an ADR cottage industry”). 
107 See id. (“Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, corporate lawyers and business 
executives naturally sought ways to expand the reach of arbitration clauses, sharing their 
tactical insights in trade journals, at conferences, and in high-level, top-secret planning 
sessions.” (citing Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7116)). 
108 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
109 See id. 
110 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Tri-
al, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (“The civil jury trial is fast disappearing from our legal 
landscape, and one important reason for its disappearance is the rapid growth of manda-
tory arbitration.” (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, JUDICIAL STATISTICAL 
INQUIRY FORM, http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last visited May 2, 
2013))). 
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[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . . The Arbitration Act establish-
es that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of ar-
bitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the 
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.111 
Pursuant to this “federal policy favoring arbitration,”112 the Court 
interprets defenses to agreements to arbitrate particularly narrowly,113 
interprets arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers especially 
broadly,114 and regularly expands the reach and impact of arbitration 
clauses and waivers by mandating individual arbitration in areas pre-
viously thought to be within the exclusive domain of litigation.115  Alt-
hough the Court has not expressly stated that binding arbitration can 
apply to all federal court claims, scholars have recognized that this 
preference for arbitration over litigation “often has the same ef-
fect.”116 
The Court recently furthered its policy favoring arbitration by sig-
nificantly broadening the applicability of corporations’ class arbitra-
tion waivers.  In 2011’s AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court 
held that the FAA preempts state laws that would hold adhesive con-
tracts’ class arbitration waivers to be unenforceable.117 
As would be typical of such state laws, the state law at issue in Con-
cepcion classified class arbitration waivers contained in adhesive con-
sumer contracts as unconscionable because a state legislature deter-
mined that such waivers so effectively insulated companies from class-
based claims that they cheated large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money.118  Nonetheless, the Court, invoking 
its “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”119 held that the FAA 
preempts such state laws, as they “stan[d] as an obstacle to [the 
FAA’s] accomplishment and execution.”120 
 
111 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25 (citing Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 
(7th Cir. 1981)).  The Court has neglected to explain this policy or its rationale. 
112 Id. at 24. 
113 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 697 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25). 
114 See id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)). 
115 See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). 
116 Sternlight, supra note 103, at 77 . 
117 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Sternlight, supra note 22, 
at 705–06 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748–53) (explaining Concepcion). 
118 See Sternlight, supra note 22, at 705 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 
148, 162–63 (2005)). 
119 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120 Id. at 1756 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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In the aftermath of Concepcion’s striking of such pro-consumer 
state laws, scholars expect, and are seeing, even more companies in-
corporating arbitration clauses containing class arbitration waivers in 
their adhesive consumer contracts, as “[c]hallenges to [these] waivers 
based on state statutory or common law will likely face greater diffi-
culty navigating the Court’s Concepcion decision.”121 
Consequently, for its support and expansion of adhesive contracts’ 
arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers and their enforce-
ment, scope, and impact, the Court’s policy favoring arbitration over 
litigation goes a measurable way toward permitting corporate and 
commercial entities to use adhesive, FAA-supported arbitration 
agreements to preclude consumer plaintiffs from being heard before 
a jury.  However, as detailed below, it is the federal courts’ emphatic 
enforcement of this policy and the Concepcion decision that is primari-
ly responsible for the inability of present-day consumers to exercise 
their constitutional right to be heard by a jury. 
B.  The Federal Courts’ Emphatic Response to the Court’s Policy Favoring 
Arbitration 
In response to the Court’s sweeping policy preference for arbitra-
tion over litigation, the federal courts have reacted emphatically.  Not 
only have they followed suit by likewise narrowly interpreting defens-
es to arbitration,122 broadly interpreting arbitration clauses,123 and 
mandating arbitration in a wide array of new areas,124 but they have 
actually gone further. 
Guided by their expansive interpretation of the Court’s policy fa-
voring arbitration, the federal courts almost always disregard the lan-
guage and placement of arbitration clauses and class arbitration waiv-
ers as well as the parties’ degrees of knowledge, sophistication, and 
education to conclude that an arbitration clause was sufficiently clear 
and conspicuous to constitute a valid, binding agreement.125  For ex-
ample, the federal courts routinely uphold confusingly worded and 
buried arbitration agreements that fail to inform consumers that by 
 
121 Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse:  Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1218 (2012). 
122 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 697–98 (citing Ex parte Smith, 736 So. 2d 604, 610 (Ala. 
1999)). 
123 See id. at 697 (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
124 See id. at 698 (citing Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763, 767 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
125 See Sternlight, supra note 103, at 26 (citing Scher v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 723 F. Supp. 
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (discussing the courts’ noteworthy interpretation of the Court’s pol-
icy favoring arbitration). 
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accepting arbitration, they have waived their right to trial by jury,126 
and insist that “typical investors, senior citizens, and consumers are 
all sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the significance 
of . . . arbitration provision[s].”127  Some courts have even gone so far 
as to enforce arbitration agreements where the contract signed did 
not refer to arbitration, but merely incorporated it by reference to 
another, separate document that called for arbitration.128 
Accordingly, this disregard for the clauses’ clarity and conspicu-
ousness has led the courts to enforce legalese-filled, inconspicuous, 
“envelope-stuffer” amendments to adhesion contracts—“for example, 
the unread notice stuffed in a consumer’s monthly bill stating that, by 
continuing to use her credit card, or her telephone, she agrees to ar-
bitrate any dispute that may arise.”129  Increasingly, and disturbingly, 
these notices containing arbitration clauses and class arbitration 
waivers are taking the form of mass e-mails or Web site postings, and 
the courts have seemingly had no qualms about enforcing them.130 
As a consequence of corporations’ awareness of the courts’ lack of 
concern for arbitration agreements’ clarity or conspicuousness, arbi-
tration clauses’ and class arbitration waivers’ prohibitive language is 
now usually “buried between the fine print and legalese,” leaving 
consumers “unable to recognize that they have entered into an 
agreement that effectively waives their right to bring a class action or 
adjudicate the issue in anything other than an arbitral forum.131 
Additionally, the courts regularly enforce coercive and fraudulent-
ly procured agreements containing arbitration clauses and class arbi-
tration waivers.132  For instance, the courts have been so willing to en-
force agreements to arbitrate that they have upheld the imposition of 
arbitration where a company verbally misled consumers regarding 
the provision, such as where a company’s agent falsely stated that 
 
126 See id. at 26–27 (citing Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985)). 
127 Id. at 27 (citing McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10122, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1994)). 
128 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 701 (citing R.J. O’Brien & Assoc., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 
257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
129 Gilles, supra note 20, at 377. 
130 See id. (citing Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Tex. 2000)). 
131 Christina Johnson, Employment and Consumer Arbitration Agreements:  Does It Limit Your Abil-
ity to Bring or Participate in a Class Action?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 273, 277 (2010). 
132 See Sternlight, supra note 116, at 26 (“[R]ather than admit that an arbitration agreement 
is unclear, fraudulent, coercive or unfair, courts have often engaged in highly formalistic 
analyses that essentially reject reality and factual distinctions in favor of this mythical vi-
sion.”) 
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signing the arbitration clause would not compromise any rights.133  
The courts have likewise enforced arbitration agreements even where 
company representatives lulled consumers into signing the clause by 
stating that the clause was a “mere formality.”134 
Such extraordinary deference to arbitration agreements has be-
come pervasive among the federal courts, prompting scholars to 
rightly recognize that “[r]ather than admit an arbitration agreement 
is . . . fraudulent, coercive, or unfair, courts have often engaged in 
highly formalistic analyses that essentially reject reality and factual 
distinctions in favor of this mythical version.”135 
Moreover, guided by their expansive interpretation of the Court’s 
policy favoring arbitration, the federal courts do not require that ad-
hesive arbitration clauses or class arbitration waivers be entered into 
“knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently,”136 permitting “the pro-
arbitration policy . . . [to] trum[p] [these] considerations.”137  Not on-
ly is this inequitable, but this approach conflicts with the prevailing 
standard for permissive waivers of the right to trial by jury, which 
mandates that the parties knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waive their right to trial by jury.138 
For example, courts typically do not even consider whether an ar-
bitration agreement was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, or intel-
ligently.139  Instead, they apply standard “objective” rules for contract 
formation, holding that arbitration-clause-containing “adhesive con-
tracts are valid, so long as they are not unconscionable, fraudulent, 
obtained under duress, or otherwise invalid.”140  In an especially tell-
 
133 See id. at 31 (citing Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 
1988)). 
134 Id. (quoting Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. DeFries, No. 94-Civ. 0020 (WK), 1994 WL 
455178, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994)). 
135 Id. at 26. 
136 Sternlight, supra note 28, at 699 (citing Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exception-
al Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
195, 197 (1998)). 
137 Nima H. Mohebbi, Back Door Arbitration:  Why Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbi-
tration Clauses May Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 555, 557 (2010),  (cit-
ing Realty Trust Grp., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., Civil No. 1:07CV573-HSO-JMR, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007)). 
138 See Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial 
Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 449 (1997) (citing Nat’l Equipment 
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977)) (detailing this prevailing standard 
for jury trial waivers).  Though the Supreme Court has never enunciated the precise 
standard courts should employ in reviewing contractual jury trial waivers, the lower courts 
have virtually uniformly followed Hendrix.  See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 678 (citing 
Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258). 
139 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 699 (citing Ware, supra note 136, at 197). 
140 Id. (citing Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286–88 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
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ing case illustrating the court’s disregard for the jury trial waiver re-
quirements, the Seventh Circuit held that an unaware broker had 
voluntarily and knowingly accepted arbitration by virtue of one of his 
business dealings, reasoning that he could have chosen a different 
business endeavor if he did not want to arbitrate.141 
In those few cases in which the federal courts evaluated whether 
plaintiffs should be compelled to engage in individual arbitration and 
relinquish their constitutional rights to trial by jury despite their not 
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently agreeing to do so, a few courts 
recognized that a contract to arbitrate necessarily waives the jury trial 
right.  However, the federal courts neglected to explain their failure 
to apply the traditional jury trial waiver criteria to determine whether 
or not permissible waiver should be found.142  Some federal courts 
have implicitly acknowledged the conflict between consumers’ un-
knowing, involuntarily, or unintelligent consent to arbitration 
agreements and the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, but 
disregarded it, summarily stating that arbitration is “favored” by the 
Court and its interpretation of the FAA.143  Finally, other federal 
courts have disappointingly asserted that “by ‘agreeing’ to arbitrate,” 
plaintiffs consented “to have their dispute resolved in a non-Seventh 
Amendment forum, and that the court therefore need not apply 
normal waiver criteria.”144 
Consequently, the federal courts’ stark refusal to properly man-
date that adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers be 
entered into knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently in order to be en-
forced has prompted scholars to recognize that consumers “often do 
not knowingly or intelligently waive their right to a jury trial when 
they are forced to arbitrate under the FAA.”145 
Lastly, in the wake of Concepcion, and in line with the Court’s poli-
cy favoring arbitration, the federal courts are not only liberally strik-
ing consumer protection laws condemning class arbitration waivers in 
adhesive contracts, but are, more importantly, extending Concepcion’s 
reasoning to contexts not discussed or explicitly considered by the 
 
141 See Sternlight, supra note 103, at 33 (citing Geldermann v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 836 F.2d 310, 317–18 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
142 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 675–76 (citing Dillard v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
143 See id. at 676 (citing Cohen, 841 F.2d at 285, 287). 
144 Id. (citing Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). 
145 Mohebbi, supra note 137, at 557 (citing Sternlight, supra note 103, at 7) (emphasis add-
ed). 
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Court.146  For instance, the courts have relied upon Concepcion to re-
ject arguments that denying plaintiffs their class actions would violate 
state law or public policy,147 that class arbitration waivers prevent 
plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under state law,148 and that class 
arbitration waivers are not applicable as to claims for public injunc-
tive relief brought under state law.149  Many courts have even applied 
Concepcion retroactively, permitting defendants that are currently liti-
gating to oppose continued litigation by raising an arbitration de-
fense, reasoning that Concepcion’s dramatic change in the law voids 
plaintiffs’ claims that defendants waived the arbitral defense.150 
The federal courts’ expansive interpretation of Concepcion is truly 
“proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out existing and potential 
consumer . . . class actions.”151  Relatedly, if plaintiff consumers “can-
not join together as a class, lack of knowledge, lack of resources, and 
fear of retaliation will prevent them from bringing any claims at 
all.”152  For its impediment to consumers’ ability to be heard before a 
jury as a class, scholars have recognized that Concepcion and the feder-
al courts’ expansive interpretation of the decision permits “compa-
nies to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class ac-
tions,” thereby “provid[ing] companies with free rein to commit 
fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of 
being sued.”153 
Accordingly, the federal courts’ expansive implementation of the 
Court’s policy favoring arbitration and the Conception decision has 
morphed the class arbitration waiver into, as Professor Gilles ex-
plained, a corporate antigen, one that effectively travels through con-
sumers’ contractual relationships and, with the help of the arbitration 
clause, dooms consumer plaintiffs’ right to trial by jury prospects.154  
 
146 See Sternlight, supra note 22, at 709 (“[J]udges are extending Concepcion’s reasoning to 
contexts not directly discussed by the Court.”). 
147 See id. at 710 (citing Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)). 
148 See id. (citing Kaltwasser, 2011 WL 4381748, at *4–7). 
149 See id. (citing Meyer v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 23, 2011)). 
150 See id. at 711 (citing Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 
3419499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011)). 
151 Id. at 704. 
152 See id. at 704–05. 
153 Id. at 704 (citing Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion:  From Unconscionability to 
Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-
rights/). 
154 See Gilles, supra note 20, at 375–76 (explaining arbitration agreements’ function as a jury 
trial “antigen”). 
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Consequently, consumers subject to such arbitration agreements, a 
majority of consumers,155 are locked into individual, binding arbitra-
tion and are resultantly precluded from exercising their constitution-
al right to trial by jury. 
IV.  MDL PRECLUDES MASS TORT PLAINTIFFS FROM EXERCISING THEIR 
TRIAL-BY-JURY RIGHT 
Despite its formal consistency with the Seventh Amendment’s tri-
al-by-jury guarantee, analysis indicates that the MDL process impels 
mass tort plaintiffs to accept pretrial settlement, precluding them 
from being heard by a jury.  Although precise statistics concerning 
MDL claim resolution are unavailable, it is certain that only a small 
percentage of actions are remanded for individual jury trials, as virtu-
ally all are induced to settle.156  Accordingly, as many litigants have ar-
gued in recent years, settlement is the only realistic option for the 
resolution of MDL claims.157 
In enacting the MDL statute, Congress clearly prioritized efficien-
cy and economy over individual convenience and rights:  the goal 
and effect of MDL is clearly to produce settlements with low transac-
tion costs.158  However, in attempting to realize this goal, legislators 
and the courts have unjustly promoted such efficiency over mass tort 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to trial by jury.  In the name of this ef-
ficiency, the JPML commonly orders MDL transfer of mass tort ac-
tions involving one or more issues of common fact—sua sponte, or at 
the behest of a commercial defendant who is aware that MDL creates 
“the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement,”159 and often over 
 
155 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
156 See Barton, supra note 38, at 210  (“[O]nly a small percentage of actions are remanded.” 
(citing Shawn Copeland et al., Toxic Tort and Environmental Matters:  Civil Litigation, 64 
ALI-ABA 33, 40 (1998))); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
576, 593 (2008) (“[S]ettlement is currently the only realistic option for collective resolu-
tion of mass claims . . . .”). 
157 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate at *8, Hayford v. A.W. 
Chesterton Co., No. 08CV01479 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 7853952 (“[T]he in-
terminable delay wrought by transfer to the MDL . . . effectively denies the plaintiffs their 
rights to trial by jury.”).  
158 See Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of Expediency, 1997 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 833 (1997) (“[I]n enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Congress chose to allow 
judicial efficiency to outweigh individual convenience . . . .” (citing Robert H. Trangsrud, 
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 809 (1985))).  
159  Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
265, 270 (2011). 
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plaintiffs’ objections—locking mass tort plaintiffs into a process that 
compels them to relinquish their trial-by-jury rights.160 
Three factors conspire to preclude mass tort MDL plaintiffs from 
securing a post-MDL trial by jury:  the prohibitive temporal and fi-
nancial costs imposed on MDL plaintiffs, particularly those not en-
gaged in contingency fee arrangements; the “settlement or nothing” 
approach adhered to by federal judges; and the inducement of set-
tlement by bellwether trials.161 
A.  MDL Imposes Preclusive Costs on Mass Tort Plaintiffs 
Post-MDL trial by jury is practically unavailable to mass tort MDL 
plaintiffs.  The temporal costs imposed on plaintiffs by the MDL pro-
cess, which are far more extreme than the typical temporal problems 
plaintiffs encounter in dealing with an overworked judicial system, ef-
fectively preclude these plaintiffs from securing a post-MDL trial by 
jury, compelling them to pursue pretrial settlement. 
Partly due to the necessity to gear MDL proceedings to the “slow-
est common denominator,”162 MDL pretrial preparation time follow-
ing transfer is regularly delayed and incredibly long,163 commonly ex-
ceeding two years164 and often taking nearly a decade.165  MDL courts 
consistently take several years to conduct discovery alone.166 
Remand for trial is truly an “empty dream”167 for many mass tort 
MDL plaintiffs—but particularly asbestos plaintiffs—unlucky enough 
to have their cases transferred to an MDL court.  One district court 
recently noted that, if a case is transferred to a particular MDL, “the 
matter will likely be substantially delayed.”168  Courts have likewise 
 
160 See supra note 156 and accompanying text; Farrell, supra note 31, at 163 (explaining that 
the JPML “seldom” transfers cases to an MDL court based on considerations pertinent to 
the individual plaintiffs). 
161  Bellwethers are carefully selected, illustrative test trials involving facts and legal issues sim-
ilar to those facing MDL litigants. 
162 Farrell, supra note 31, at 159 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport 
(Constance, Ky.) on Nov. 8, 1965, Docket No. M.D.L.—8A (J.P.M.L. 1965)). 
163 See Geduldig, supra note 39, at 310 (“[Mass tort MDL] litigation is invariably delayed and 
claims are often left unresolved.” (citing Linda S. Mullenix, High Court Should Review Mass 
Torts, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 7, 1996, at A19)). 
164 See Robert Sayler & William Skinner, Legal Lore the Mother of All Battles:  The Quest for Asbes-
tos Insurance Coverage, 27 LITIG. , no. 1, 45 (detailing a four-year-long MDL proceeding). 
165 See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 434 (1986) 
(“[C]ases pending eight years still have not been heard.”). 
166 See Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL?  A Defense Perspective, 24 LITIG., no. 4, 43, 44 
(1998) (“[D]iscovery will not be completed for months or years.”). 
167 Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate, supra note 157, at 3. 
168 Hilbert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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recognized that transfer to an asbestos MDL may result in the plain-
tiff “not [being] heard for many years”169 and will force the plaintiff to 
“languish[] for a protracted period of time.”170  In reference to a 
popular asbestos MDL, another district court aptly recognized that no 
“trials or discovery takes place in deference to global settlement ef-
forts.”171 
The prospect of engaging in a protracted trial following years of 
such time-consuming MDL proceedings is simply not an option for 
many plaintiffs.  MDL plaintiffs are commonly ill and need monetary 
relief soon.  Their lives very often depend on it, literally, so they likely 
lack years to wait for the initiation and completion of a trial following 
the already lengthy pretrial MDL process.172  Scholars have noted the 
“real concern that many [mass tort MDL] plaintiffs will die before 
they are compensated and a great many will wait years for their 
awards.”173  Many attorneys who represent asbestos MDL plaintiffs 
have voiced concern that “current trends in the [MDL] threaten 
payments to the truly sick.”174  The situation concerning asbestos is 
not unique, as the MDL involving breast implants and Dalkon Shield, 
a contraceptive intrauterine device, imposed comparable delays on 
plaintiffs, raising similar concerns.175 
Consequently, for many mass tort MDL plaintiffs, the temporal 
costs of a jury trial following the years spent languishing in the MDL 
court are preclusive of their ability to exercise their right to trial by 
jury. 
The financial costs engendered by pretrial MDL proceedings are 
likewise extremely high, forcing the substantial number of individual 
plaintiffs who do not retain counsel under a contingency fee ar-
rangement—such as the many plaintiffs compensating counsel at an 
 
169 Madden v. Able Supply Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
170 Rosamond v. Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., No. 3:03CV235, 2004 WL 943924, at *4 (N.D. 
Miss. Apr. 5, 2004). 
171 In re Me. Asbestos Cases, 44 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 n.2 (D. Me. 1999). 
172 See Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2, 34–35 (Mar. 1991)) (“The 
asbestos litigation produced the real and present danger that transaction costs would ex-
haust available assets before plaintiffs could collect for judgments, if obtained.”). 
173 Id. (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 141 (1995)). 
174 Schwartz et al., supra note 55, at 274 (citing Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar 
Lungs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 36, available at 2001 WL 30366341). 
175 See Higgins, supra note 40, at 53 (“[M]ass torts are the legal system’s version of a nuclear 
exchange:  Thousands of complex claims.  Huge potential damages.  Massive discovery 
and expense.  The litigation over silicone breast implants has been all of that and 
more . . . for every dollar the plaintiffs finally recover, experts estimate that litigation ex-
penses will have eaten up another 60 to 75 cents . . . .”). 
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hourly rate—to settle their claims and skip an expensive post-MDL 
trial.176  These plaintiffs, many of whom simultaneously face steep 
medical bills,177 are thus effectively prohibited from pursuing post-
MDL jury trial by MDL proceedings’ sizable costs.178  This is news to 
no one, as judges have long acknowledged MDL pretrial proceedings’ 
prohibitive costs, particularly in the asbestos realm.179 
The exorbitant expense of MDL proceedings engenders “the real 
and present danger that transaction costs w[ill] exhaust”180 the par-
ties’ funds, forcing them into bankruptcy and stifling litigation.  In 
fact, those few successful mass tort plaintiffs expend nearly twice the 
amount they recover on consolidated pretrial proceeding transaction 
costs, sending a clear signal to other mass tort plaintiffs to seek an 
economical resolution in the form of a convenient, net-positive set-
tlement.181  Much of this stems from the expenses associated with 
MDL’s particularly protracted discovery proceedings; in MDL, it is 
 
176 See ROXANNE BARTON CONLIN & GREGORY S. CUSIMANO, 1 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 8:31 
(2012) (noting that some mass tort plaintiffs compensate their attorneys at an hourly 
rate, and “[w]here counsel are compensated based on an hourly rate, the expenses asso-
ciated with MDL practice are ultimately passed on to the client”); Farrell, supra note 31, 
at 161 (“[C]onsolidation has imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs in the aviation dis-
aster cases by increasing the time and cost of preparation.”); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. 
Syverud, Don’t Try:  Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 
(1996) (noting that rising civil litigation costs are “driv[ing] [parties] to skip all these ex-
pensive procedures and settle”).  Although precise data concerning the portion of mass 
tort MDL plaintiffs retaining counsel pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement relative 
to those compensating counsel at an hourly rate, or pursuant to another scheme, are un-
available, it is certain that a substantial portion—likely a minority—are not operating un-
der a contingency fee arrangement.  As a result, they bear all the costs of MDL’s pricey, 
protracted procedures.  See CONLIN & CUSIMANO, supra (noting that some mass tort plain-
tiffs compensate counsel at an hourly rate); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Nego-
tiation, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 341, 343 (1987) (“The alternate method of fee calcula-
tion . . . is the so-called lodestar system in which the lawyer is compensated with an hourly 
rate, perhaps adjusted by some multiplier to reflect the quality of the work or the element 
of risk involved.”); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate:  Relationships, Repre-
sentation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 304 (1996) (implying that a portion of mass tort 
plaintiffs eschew contingency fee arrangements by asserting that “[s]ome claimants may 
have entered into contingency-fee contracts with individual lawyers.” (emphasis added)). 
177 See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 720 (2005) 
(stating that mass tort plaintiffs may owe “thousands of dollars in medical bills” allegedly 
stemming from the defendants’ negligence). 
178 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
179 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev’d in part, aff’d in 
part, 789 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“The bench, bar and public at large are only too well 
aware of the staggering costs that the asbestos personal injury litigation has generated.”). 
180 Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2, 34–35). 
181 See id. at 202–03 (“[T]ransaction costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to 
one . . . .” (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC 
COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 3)). 
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not uncommon, for instance, for “[e]xpenses for a single deposi-
tion . . . [to] exceed $10,000.00,”182 a price often “passed on to the cli-
ent.”183 
In the breast implants MDL, for example, for every dollar plain-
tiffs recovered, pre-trial expenses consumed another sixty to seventy-
five cents.184  Unsurprisingly, as a result of costs engendered by MDL, 
at least one implant maker filed for bankruptcy not long after the ini-
tiation of the implants MDL.185 
Further, in the asbestos MDL, successful plaintiffs recover “con-
siderably less than a third”186 of the “tens of billions that will be ex-
pended”187 by the litigants on MDL’s transaction costs.  The transac-
tion costs associated with litigating asbestos suits in the MDL court 
leave the successful asbestos plaintiffs “only thirty-nine cents of every 
asbestos dollar paid.”188 
Accordingly, for many mass tort MDL plaintiffs, the prospect of 
proceeding to post-MDL trial with its “attendant expense and unpre-
dictability”189 after already costly MDL proceedings is prohibitively 
uneconomical, if not financially impossible. 
B.  The MDL Judiciary Abides by a “Settlement or Nothing” Approach 
The federal MDL judiciary’s pervasive “settlement or nothing” ap-
proach also contributes to MDL plaintiffs’ practical inability to exer-
cise their right to trial by jury.190 
The past several decades have seen the culture of federal judging 
shift toward “an ideal of the managerial judge and away from a more 
neutral, judicial umpire and trial model.”191  Pursuant to this new 
model, judges prioritize expediting and resolving parties’ disputes 
over affording litigants access to an impartial forum to manage their 
litigation.192  To do so, judges “experiment with schemes for speeding 
 
182 CONLIN & CUSIMANO, supra note 176, § 8:31 n.1. 
183 Id. § 8:31. 
184 See Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing Higgins, supra note 40, at 53). 
185 See id. (citing Higgins, supra note 40, at 53). 
186 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION:  THE EFFECT OF CLASS 
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 23 (1995). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 159, at 270. 
190 See id. (“[MDL] creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement: . . . judicial 
encouragement for a global settlement . . . .” (citing Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice:  Verdict 
Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1013,  1056–66)). 
191 See KANNER, supra note 60, at 23 (citing Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
374 (1982)) (explaining this shift in judicial ideology). 
192 See id. (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 45). 
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the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to settle rather 
than try cases whenever possible.”193 
This shift toward settlement as the ideal is particularly pervasive in 
the MDL courts; MDL judges—district court judges presiding over 
MDL proceedings—more so than those not overseeing MDL pro-
ceedings, consistently prioritize and push for plaintiffs to settle before 
the MDL court by verbally encouraging settlement and highlighting 
post-MDL trial’s substantial costs.194  They direct discovery to focus on 
information pertinent to settlement, prolong the already slow and 
expensive MDL proceedings to induce settlement, refer the parties to 
magistrate judges for settlement negotiations, appoint special man-
agers and settlement counsel to support settlement, and aggressively 
utilize settlement conferences and firm trial dates to realize expedi-
tious settlement.195  This “settlement or nothing” attitude is “in-
grained”196 in many MDL judges, who view their role as “getting the 
parties to a claims process—a settlement—as quickly as possible.”197  
Accordingly, scholars and judges have begun to recognize that MDL 
judges treat “the MDL process . . . only as a mechanism for reaching a 
settlement,”198 and those litigants who acted lawfully and desire adju-
dication before a jury, but are nonetheless before an MDL court, can 
“no longer hope to prevail.”199  While the MDL judiciary’s “settlement 
or nothing” approach bolsters efficiency and economy, it is repug-
 
193 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982). 
194 See ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.11 (David Herr ed., 2009) 
(“[T]he judge can focus the parties’ attention on the likely cost of litigating the case to 
conclusion, in fees, expenses, time, and other resources.  Other helpful measures include 
scheduling settlement conferences, directing or encouraging reluctant parties, insurers, 
and other potential contributors to participate, suggesting and arranging for a neutral 
person to assist negotiations, targeting discovery at information needed for settlement, 
and promptly deciding motions whose resolution will lay the groundwork for settle-
ment.”); Richard J. Arsenault & J.R. Whaley, Multidistrict Litigation and Bellwether Trials:  
Leading Litigants to Resolution in Complex Litigation, 39 BRIEF 60, 61 (2009) (detailing MDL 
judges’ “various techniques to promote settlement” (citing ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, § 13.1-.15)); Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45 (“Many [MDL] 
judges view their role as ‘getting the parties to a claims process’—a settlement—as quickly 
as possible . . . . [T]he MDL process serves only as a mechanism for reaching a settle-
ment.”); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?  Toward a Maximalist 
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2277–79 
(2008) (discussing the MDL judiciary’s role in “settlement promotion” (citing In re No-
vak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1404 (11th Cir. 1991))). 
195 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
196 Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45. 
197 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
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nant in that it is partially responsible for many mass tort plaintiffs’ in-
ability to exercise their constitutional right to trial by jury. 
Many who have recognized the judiciary’s overwhelming support 
of MDL’s function “as a means of achieving final, global [settlement] 
of mass . . . disputes”200 have decried this “unfortunat[e]”201 reality as 
productive of coercive “blackmail settlements.”202  Chief Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, for example, denounced what he perceives as the 
“model of the central planner”203 underlying attitudes toward the set-
tlement of aggregate litigation.  The MDL courts’ aggressive use of 
the judicial settlement conference to realize settlement, for instance, 
has been criticized as using “[t]he most controversial of all judicial 
management tools . . . stray[ing] furthest from the judiciary’s tradi-
tional adjudicative role”204 by those opposed to MDL’s current role as 
a “settlement promotion”205 device.  That nearly all MDL cases con-
clude in pretrial settlement206 thus comes as no surprise. 
Accordingly, despite its furtherance of economy and efficiency, 
the federal judiciary’s pressuring and prioritizing settlement is worri-
some and should be critically addressed; this pervasive “settlement or 
nothing” approach works in tandem with the substantial costs associ-
ated with MDL proceedings and bellwether trials’ inducement of set-
tlement to practically preclude MDL plaintiffs from exercising their 
right to be heard by a jury. 
C.  Bellwether Trials Induce and Accelerate MDL Settlement 
Bellwether trials, a practice pervasive in MDL and unique to ag-
gregate litigation, facilitate, accelerate, and “supply a strong impetus 
for”207 pretrial MDL settlement.  Bellwethers afford parties to an MDL 
real world, settlement-inducing jury data concerning claim valuation, 
strategies and novel issues in the litigation, parties’ strengths and 
weaknesses, probabilities of success, and the answers to important 
questions otherwise only answerable through the lessons of years of 
 
200 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig. 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
201 Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45. 
202 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
203 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
204 Marcus, supra note 194, at 2277 (quoting Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New 
Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 43 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
205 Id. at 2278–79 (citing Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases:  The 
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 358 (1986)). 
206 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
207 Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2366. 
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mass tort litigation.208  Bellwethers thus create a particularly “favorable 
environment for global resolution through settlement,”209 enable cor-
porate defendants and MDL judges to employ particularly influential 
data and information to pressure plaintiffs and their PMCs to settle 
their tort claims, and, consequently, work in tandem with MDL pro-
ceedings’ exorbitant costs and the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or 
nothing” approach to effectively prohibit MDL plaintiffs from secur-
ing a trial by jury. 
Given that a test run can never faultlessly duplicate a trial, a court 
management technique common to MDL is to try a small number of 
selected cases, affording the parties “an accurate picture of how dif-
ferent juries would view different cases across the spectrum of weak 
and strong cases that are aggregated.”210  Such a case typically involves 
“facts, claims, or defenses that are similar to [those] presented in a 
wider group of related cases.”211  These “test cases” are known as bell-
wether trials.  While the parties to an MDL can consent to be bound 
by the bellwether jury trial’s verdict, doing so is uncommon.212  Al-
most always, bellwether cases’ judgments are only legally binding on 
those particular litigants involved.213  The MDL court can select the 
cases that will serve as bellwether cases, or the MDL court may permit 
the parties to select a certain number of cases to serve as bellweth-
ers.214  Given the prevalence of bellwethers, “[s]ecuring parties’ con-
sent for these trials is now an important aspect of the MDL courts’ 
management of cases.”215 
 
208 See id. at 2325 (“[B]y injecting juries and fact-finding into multidistrict litigation, bell-
wether trials assist in the maturation of disputes by providing an opportunity for coordi-
nating counsel to organize the products of pretrial common discovery, evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and 
costs associated with the litigation.”). 
209 Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61.  See Bradt, supra note 11, at 790  (“[B]ellwether 
trials . . . provide important data about the value of the claims, perhaps leading to settle-
ment discussions.” (citing Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2005))); Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2325 (“[T]he bellwether 
process can precipitate global settlement negotiations and ensure that such negotiations 
do not occur in a vacuum, but rather in light of real-world evaluations of the litigation by 
multiple juries.”). 
210 Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation:  Initiatives and Impediments for Reshap-
ing the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006). 
211 Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2325. 
212 See Sherman, supra note 210, at 696–97 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l 
Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989) (explaining the effects of bellwether judg-
ments), rev’d on other grounds, 964 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
213 See id. at 697. 
214 See id. 
215 Bradt, supra note 11, at 789 (citing Lee et al., supra note 11, at 5). 
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The appeal, and vice, of bellwether trials stems from their in-
ducement and acceleration of pretrial MDL settlement,216 a function 
that bellwether trials are aimed at realizing.217 Because bellwether tri-
als comprise a representative sample of an MDL’s cases, they yield 
important, reliable information concerning the strengths and weak-
nesses of the sides’ cases and potential trial strategies, claim valua-
tion, and probabilities of success before a jury, and enable the work-
ing through of novel issues in individual litigation “before either an 
aggregate trial or, much more likely, a global settlement.”218 
Bellwethers thus permit mass torts to “mature” without years of 
expensive litigation otherwise required for such maturity, providing 
the parties with informed answers to the questions that one must 
consider when evaluating settlement:  “What does the liability picture 
look like?  Are there comparative negligence issues?  Is preemption 
or the exclusion of experts going to be in play?  What are the ranges 
of damages? Will punitive damages be a factor?  How long will it take 
to try cases, and at what cost?  How many and what types of experts 
will be required?  Will the cost to litigate any single case exceed po-
tential recoveries?”219 
Consequently, these “real-world evaluations of the litigation by 
multiple juries”220 not only “anchor litigants’ otherwise speculative 
and overly hopeful settlement claim valuations”221 and “se[t] the stage 
for . . . global resolution,”222 but they, more importantly, enable cor-
porate defendants and MDL judges to employ particularly accurate, 
influential data and information to pressure plaintiffs and their PMCs 
to settle their mass tort claims.223  Accordingly, since bellwethers’ 
emergence, scholars, litigants, attorneys, and judges commonly at-
 
216 See Stier, supra note 190, at 1059–61 (citing Barbara J. Rothstein et al., A Model Mass Tort:  
The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 625 (2006)) (detailing bellwethers’ inducement 
of settlement). 
217 See Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2343 (explaining that bellwethers trials’ goals are to 
serve as “indicators of future trends and catalysts for an ultimate resolution”). 
218 Sherman, supra note 210, at 698; see also Bradt, supra note 11, at 790 (“Even though the 
results of these bellwether trials are not binding on parties who are not participants in the 
trials, they provide important data about the value of the claims, perhaps leading to set-
tlement discussions.” (citing Cabraser, supra note 209, at 1485)). 
219 See Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61 (citing ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra note 194, at § 22.314) (detailing the important pre-settlement legal 
questions for which bellwethers furnish reliable, informative answers). 
220 Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2366. 
221 Stier, supra note 190, at 1059 (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
222 Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61. 
223 See id. at 61 (explaining how bellwethers are “used in mass torts to value cases and en-
courage settlement”). 
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tribute the realization of cases’ global resolution to bellwethers’ set-
tlement-inducing efforts.224 
Bellwethers also facilitate the settlement of those comparable 
claims not yet before an MDL court, as mass tort lawyers “keep care-
ful track of verdicts and settlements in other cases, and this infor-
mation provides the basis for considerable agreement as to the set-
tlement value of individual cases.”225  By “bringing fact-finding to the 
forefront of multidistrict litigation,”226 bellwethers facilitate the reali-
zation of settlement—both today and, in the case of comparable fu-
ture cases, tomorrow. 
Thus, despite the federal judiciary’s admiration of bellwethers for 
the mechanism’s support of judicial economy and efficiency,227 there 
exists at least one reason to be critical of the practice.  Namely, bell-
wethers—by affording litigants real jury data concerning claim valua-
tion, parties’ strengths and weaknesses, probabilities of success, trial 
strategies, novel issues in the litigation, and answers to important 
questions otherwise only answerable through the lessons of years of 
litigation—accelerate and support defendants’ and MDL courts’ in-
ducement of pretrial settlement.  These bellwethers work in tandem 
with MDL’s exorbitant costs and the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or 
nothing” approach to practically preclude mass tort MDL plaintiffs 
from securing a post-MDL trial by jury. 
V.  THE COURT’S PERMISSIVE SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
ENABLES THESE PRACTICES TO RELEGATE PLAINTIFFS’ TRIAL-BY-JURY 
RIGHT 
That a substantial majority of consumer and mass tort MDL plain-
tiffs are practically unable to exercise their constitutional right to trial 
by jury raises a number of serious questions and concerns.  Principal, 
however, is the question of how the Court permitted the Seventh 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee to play second fiddle to the judici-
ary’s preference for FAA-supported arbitration and MDL’s efficiency 
and economy benefits. 
This Part explores this question, analyzing the Court’s Seventh 
Amendment trial-by-jury jurisprudence, a cluster of five cases in 
 
224 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2369, 2378 (2008) (“[I]n the absence of the bellwether procedure these cases would 
not have settled . . . .”). 
225 Sherman, supra note 210, at 701 n.37. 
226 Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2341–42. 
227 See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (regarding bell-
wethers as a “sound” practice). 
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which the Court considered five civil procedural innovations against 
the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee.228  This Comment 
pays particular attention to the Court’s mode of analysis concerning 
the meaning and substance of the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial 
guarantee and how the contested procedures impact the guarantee. 
This Part also provides an answer to this question:  the Court has 
demonstrated a striking willingness to accept modern civil procedural 
innovations’ impacts on the civil jury trial through formal rather than 
pragmatic Seventh Amendment analyses, focusing primarily on the 
threshold issue of power-shifting between the judge and jury and de-
clining to craft a meaningful trial-by-jury jurisprudence that would 
provide us with an operative understanding of the right.  Conse-
quently, we lack a Seventh Amendment vocabulary with which to ana-
lyze procedures implicating or, in the case of FAA-supported arbitra-
tion agreements and MDL, conflicting with plaintiffs’ exercise of 
their constitutional trial-by-jury rights, permitting the continued vital-
ity of such procedures and their attendant infringements upon plain-
tiffs’ right. 
A.  Dimick v. Schiedt and Additur 
In 1934’s Dimick v. Schiedt, the sole case in which the Court struck 
a procedure as inconsistent with the trial-by-jury guarantee, the Court 
considered whether the guarantee was consistent with additur, a 
judge’s unilateral increase of a jury’s damages award.229  After the jury 
awarded the plaintiff five hundred dollars, the plaintiff moved for a 
new trial on the ground that the jury rendered an inadequate ver-
dict.230  The judge granted plaintiff’s motion but stated that he would 
not enforce it if the defendant consented to an increase of the jury’s 
damages award.231  After the defendant consented to the increase and 
 
228 The Court decided several other cases interpreting the Seventh Amendment’s reexami-
nation clause and rendered one other decision dealing exclusively with the court’s inter-
pretation of complex patent claims.  See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 
415 (1996) (holding that New York’s law controlling compensation awards for excessive-
ness or inadequacy can be given effect, consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s reex-
amination clause, if the review standard set out in the New York statute is applied by the 
federal courts with appellate control of the trial court’s ruling limited to review for “abuse 
of discretion”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding 
that patent claim construction is a matter of law to be determined by the court).  Howev-
er, because these cases shed no further light on, and are largely impertinent to, the 
meaning and substance of plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury right, they are not included in this analy-
sis. 
229 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934). 
230 Id. at 475. 
231 Id. at 475–76. 
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the Court resultantly denied plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff ap-
pealed.232  The appellate court reversed, deeming the trial-by-jury 
guarantee inconsistent with additur.233 
In evaluating and ultimately affirming the unconstitutionality of 
additur, the Court launched a brief analysis of, first, whether additur 
or an analogous procedure existed at common law.  It found that an 
“authoritative decision sustaining the power of an English court to 
[employ additur]”234 or an analogous procedure did not exist.  In fact, 
the common law rules “forbade the court to increase the amount of 
damages awarded by a jury.”235  Consequently, the court explained 
that, because the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury right “has in ef-
fect adopted the rules of the common law,”236 additur must be strick-
en, as “[t]o effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the 
common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution.”237 
Despite its conclusion condemning additur, the Court declined to 
discuss its meaning or substance, any trial-by-jury policy concerns, or 
even how, exactly, additur infringed upon the right such that the 
procedure was unconstitutional.  The Court’s only statement con-
cerning additur’s practical inconsistency with the trial-by-jury guaran-
tee was that, when additur is employed, “no jury . . . ever passe[s] on 
the increased amount.”238  From this, we can infer that the Court rea-
soned that an increase to a jury’s damages award, an issue of “fact,” is 
impermissible because the jury never considered awarding an 
amount more than it actually awarded in damages.  A court-ordered 
increase in the damages award would therefore constitute a court 
impermissibly serving as finder of fact by independently determining 
damages. 
Not only is this reasoning unconvincing, as the Court fails to sub-
stantiate why it is valid to assume that a jury never considered a dam-
ages award larger than it actually awarded, but it sheds no light on 
the meaning or substance of the trial-by-jury guarantee that additur 
supposedly infringes upon. 
The Court then focused on “the controlling distinction between 
the power of the court and that of the jury,”239 though it spoke exclu-
sively to the former.  In a relatively lengthy discussion, the Court de-
 
232 See id. at 476. 
233 See id. 
234 Id. at 476–77. 
235 Id. at 482. 
236 Id. at 487. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 485. 
239 Id. at 486. 
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tailed the contours of a judge’s authority concerning a jury’s damages 
award, which is quite expansive:  judges are empowered to, for exam-
ple, decrease, but not increase, a jury’s damages award, as such a 
practice was permitted at common law.240 
However, the Court, again, failed to delineate or even allude to 
the substance or meaning of the trial-by-jury right, nor did the Court 
address the jury’s substantive powers or their preservation, stating on-
ly that “the jury . . . [has] the power . . . to determine the facts,”241 
such as damages.  Nonetheless, despite the Court’s formidable au-
thority and its failure to lay out how additur infringed upon the trial-
by-jury right, the Court reiterated that, because courts were prohibit-
ed from increasing damages awards at common law, additur was an 
unconstitutional practice, and struck it accordingly.242 
B.  Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. and a Partial New 
Trial on Separable Legal Issues 
In 1931’s Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., the Court 
considered whether the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee 
was consistent with a court’s ordering of a partial new trial to deter-
mine damages following a jury’s verdict on damages and liability.243  
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover contractu-
al royalties.244  After the jury rendered its verdict, the appellate court 
reversed and ordered a new trial, but restricted it to the determina-
tion of damages, not liability, as the first jury had properly decided 
the latter.245  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the withdrawal from 
consideration by the new jury of his liability was a denial of his right 
to trial by jury.246 
The Court began its brief evaluation of a partial new trial on sepa-
rable legal issues by employing its historical approach, finding that, 
although the practice did not exist at common law, several eight-
eenth-century state legislatures codified the practice.247  Given this in-
consistency, the Court proceeded to examine whether this practice 




242 Id. at 487–88. 
243 283 U.S. 494 (1931). 
244 Id. at 495. 
245 Id. at 496–97. 
246 Id. at 497. 
247 Id. at 497–98. 
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tion is concerned, not with form, but with substance.”248  As expected, 
however, the Court said almost nothing about the substance of or 
policies underlying the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, 
except that “[a]ll of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of 
fact be submitted”249 to the jury, and the issue of damages is one of 
fact.250 
Unsurprisingly, without detailing the partial new trial’s impact on 
the right to trial by jury, the Court proceeded to uphold the partial 
new trial as consistent with the trial-by-jury right.  “[W]here the re-
quirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to 
law upon one issue of fact”251 and a separable issue must be retried, 
the Seventh Amendment does not require the entire case to be re-
tried, but permits the Court to submit to a new jury just the separable 
issue.  The Court reasoned that, in such cases, all of the “issues of 
fact”252 are inevitably submitted to a jury. 
The Court’s analysis is unsatisfying.  Not only did the Court again 
decline to define or even discuss the substance of or policies behind 
the right to trial by jury, but it failed to consider how a partial new 
trial on a separable legal issue may practically impact or interact with 
the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee and the jury’s ability to 
serve as finder of fact.  For example, the Court did not offer any 
guidelines concerning when courts may, consistent with the trial-by-
jury guarantee, usurp a jury’s verdict by ordering a new trial on a par-
ticular issue, and instead simply noted that the practice may be em-
ployed where the issue to be retried is “distinct and separable.”253 
Relatedly, and perhaps of greater consequence, the Court did not 
consider the potential for liberal employment of this practice to lead 
to judicial abuse or overreaching—namely, a court’s using this prac-
tice to effectively dispose of jury verdicts concerning separable issues 
with which it disagreed.  Given that this practice affords courts meas-
urable latitude concerning the practical impact of jury verdicts, one 
would reasonably expect the Court to grapple with such issues instead 
of focusing exclusively on whether the practice formally respected the 
Seventh Amendment’s command that “issues of fact be submitted”254 
to the jury.  However, clearly, one would be disappointed. 
 
248 Id. at 498. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 498–99. 
251 Id. at 499. 
252 Id. at 498. 
253 Id. at 500 (citing Norfolk S. R.R. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269, 274 (1915)). 
254 Id. at 498 (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). 
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C.  Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States and Summary Judgment 
In 1902’s Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the predecessor to summary judgment.255  
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover a sum 
owed to the plaintiff pursuant to a contract.256  Plaintiff filed a motion 
“for judgment, under the seventy-third rule, for failure of the defend-
ant to file with his plea a sufficient affidavit of defence.”257  This mo-
tion permitted the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff if two 
conditions were met:  the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating the cause 
of action and recovery owed, and the defendant failed to, with his 
plea, file an affidavit in response detailing why plaintiff should not be 
permitted to recover.258  The defendant argued that this practice de-
prived him of his right to trial by jury.259 
In upholding the summary-judgment-like practice, the Court em-
barked on yet another brief, formalistic Seventh Amendment analysis.  
Expectedly, the Court quickly established that the practice was con-
sistent with the courts’ historical practice, presaging the Court’s deci-
sion to deem it constitutional.260 
However, in an initially promising move, the Court proceeded to 
analyze the relationship between the trial-by-jury guarantee and the 
summary-judgment-like practice.261  Disappointingly, though, this 
analysis consisted entirely of the following three perplexing, unin-
formative assertions: 
[The summary-judgment-like procedure] prescribes the means of mak-
ing an issue.  The issue made as prescribed, the right of trial by jury ac-
crues.  The purpose of the . . . [procedure] is to preserve the court from 
 
255 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (“[S]ummary judgment does 
not violate the Seventh Amendment.”  (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U. 
S. 315, 319–21 (1902))).  But see Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra 
note 8, at 164 (“The Supreme Court and scholars were wrong to have cited Fidelity as the 
case that established the constitutionality of summary judgment, because the procedure 
in Fidelity did not resemble summary judgment.”). 
256 See Fid. & Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 316. 
257 Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
258 See Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 165 (citing Fid. & 
Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 318–19) (explaining this motion).  Like its progeny, the summary 
judgment motion, this motion asks for the court to issue a verdict, rather than proceed to 
trial by jury, where the court determines that no dispute of material fact exists in the case. 
259 See Fid. & Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 318. 
260 See id. at 319 (“The rule was formerly number 75 and has existed a long time.  The Court 
of Appeals of the District has sustained its validity in a number of cases.  This court also 
sustained its validity in Smoot v. Rittenhouse, decided January 10, 1876.”). 
261 See id. at 319–20. 
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frivolous defences [sic] and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as 
means to delay the recovery of just demands.262 
The Court’s analysis indicates that it was seemingly moved to up-
hold the summary-judgment-like practice because it determined that 
the practice protected the courts from frivolous defenses and merely 
framed, rather than permitted the court to decide upon, the issues, 
thus remaining formally consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s 
mandate that issues of fact be submitted to the jury.263 
This reasoning defies logic.  Permitting courts to enter judgments 
where they deem a party’s defense “frivolous” is not a framing of the 
issues, but an effective judicial determination of them based on a 
court’s assessment of the facts in dispute.  It is also strikingly reminis-
cent of the superficial reasoning underlying MDL’s continued vitali-
ty—namely, that MDL furthers judicial and litigant economy and effi-
ciency while remaining formally consistent with the trial-by-jury 
guarantee, as cases are theoretically, but not actually, remanded to 
their home districts at the close of centralized pretrial proceedings. 
Disappointingly, as is indicated by the Court’s silence concerning 
the import of the trial-by-jury right and the summary-judgment-like 
practice’s impact on the right, the Court failed to offer us any under-
standing, operative or otherwise, of the trial-by-jury right or its under-
lying policy concerns.  That the Court was not even perturbed by the 
summary-judgment-like practice is surprising, as the practice clearly 
affords the courts discretion to enter judgment for one of the parties 
exclusively based on its determination of the facts, constituting a 
clear deprivation of plaintiffs’ right to secure a jury to serve as fact-
finder.  Nonetheless, the Court seemingly had no qualms about un-
conditionally deeming the practice consistent with the trial-by-jury 
guarantee, paving the way for summary judgment to become the pro-
cedural mainstay that it is today. 
D.  Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman and Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 
The Court, in 1935’s Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 
considered the relationship between the trial-by-jury guarantee and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the practice of reserving legal 
questions arising during trials and subjecting the jury verdict to the 
court’s ultimate ruling on the legal questions reserved.  The plaintiff 
 
262 Id. at 320 (alteration in original). The Court supplemented its analysis by detailing the 
rule’s historic employment by the courts.  See id. at 319–20. 
263 See id. at 320. 
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sued the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries.264  At 
trial, the defendant moved for dismissal of the action and a directed 
verdict.265  The trial court reserved its decisions on both motions and 
submitted the case to the jury, whose verdict would be subject to the 
court’s rulings on the legal issues in the motions reserved.266  The jury 
subsequently returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court de-
nied both reserved motions.267  The appellate court reversed and or-
dered a new trial, questioning the constitutionality of the practice of 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.268 
Sustaining the constitutionality of the practice in yet another brief 
decision, the Court quickly determined that “[a]t common law there 
was a well-established practice of [employing judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict].”269  Thus, the Court emphatically upheld the prac-
tice, holding that it “undoubtedly was well established when the Sev-
enth Amendment was adopted.”270 
This time, however, the Court supplemented its formalistic opin-
ion upholding the practice of judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
with a modicum of coherent reasoning.271  The Court explained that, 
pursuant to the practice, courts only determine questions of law, such 
as “whether the evidence was sufficient or otherwise,”272 not questions 
of fact, so, as a result, the practice is respectful of plaintiffs’ “right to 
have the issues of fact determined by a jury.”273  This is the Court’s 
sole pronouncement of the trial-by-jury right’s meaning. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion is once again disappointing; it 
declined to detail the substance or policy behind the trial-by-jury 
right, simply noting, again, that juries are responsible for determin-
ing facts,274 a vague assertion that the Court often reiterates.  Instead, 
the Court chose to return to its focus on “the common-law distinction 
between the province of the court and that of the jury,”275 though on-
 





269 Id. at 659. 
270 Id. at 660. 
271 The Court also dedicated a substantial portion of its opinion to distinguishing the legally 
significant facts of the instant case from those of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.  See 
id. at 657–59, 661. 
272 Id. at 659. 
273 Id. at 658. 
274 Id.  The Court also made several impertinent assertions concerning the reexamination 
clause.  See id. 
275 Id. at 657. 
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ly detailing the former, explaining, in sum, that courts have ample 
authority to determine all questions of law regardless of the form in 
which they emerge or when the Court decides to render such deter-
minations, including, as was the case in Baltimore & Carolina Line, af-
ter the jury rendered its findings of fact.276 
Relatedly, the Court afforded no attention to the pragmatic im-
pact of the practice being upheld, focusing instead on the practice’s 
formal consistency with the notion that it only enables the court to 
rule on questions of law, leaving questions of fact to the jury.277  For 
example, the Court failed to define or discuss if or when this prac-
tice’s employment would infringe upon a jury’s ability to determine 
questions of fact.  Given that the practice permits courts to effectively 
overrule jury verdicts by deciding that, after the jury renders its ver-
dict, the party for whom the jury ruled failed to supply sufficient evi-
dence, such a concern seems warranted.  Nonetheless, the Court was 
evidently unconcerned by such prospects, convinced, instead, to en-
shrine the practice by virtue of its formal consistency with the Seventh 
Amendment’s command that “issues of fact [be] determined by a ju-
ry.”278 
E.  Galloway v. United States and Directed Verdict 
Finally, the Court, in 1943’s Galloway v. United States, evaluated the 
directed verdict, the procedure by which a court orders a verdict be-
fore the jury renders its own, employed where a court determines 
that a party has produced insufficient evidence such that no reasona-
ble jury could find in his favor.279  The plaintiff sued the government, 
and the trial court issued a directed verdict in the defendant’s fa-
vor.280  The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the directed verdict violated his trial-by-jury right.281 
The Court took little time to unconditionally uphold the directed 
verdict, finding that several analogous procedures, through which the 
 
276 Id. at 657–60. 
277 See id. at 658–59 (“The trial court expressly reserved its ruling on the defendant’s motions 
to dismiss and for a directed verdict, both of which were based on the asserted insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff.  Whether the evidence was 
sufficient or otherwise was a question of law to be resolved by the court . . . . At common 
law there was a well established practice of reserving questions of law arising during trials 
by jury and of taking verdicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions re-
served . . . .”). 
278 Id. at 658. 
279 This procedure is commonly known as judgment as a matter of law. 
280 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 373 (1943). 
281 Id. 
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court “weighed the evidence, not only piecemeal but in toto for sub-
mission to the jury,”282 existed at common law.  Consequently, pursu-
ant to its historical approach, the Court deemed the practice consti-
tutional, stating that the plaintiff’s “objection therefore comes too 
late.”283 
Despite this, the Court, in an initially promising move, embarked 
upon an evaluation of the relationship between the trial-by-jury guar-
antee and the directed verdict.284  However, yet again, the Court failed 
to offer any insight concerning the substance, meaning, or policy be-
hind the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, instead sup-
porting its conclusion that the right to trial by jury and the directed 
verdict are consistent by detailing historical evidence for its assertion 
that “[t]he jury was not absolute master of fact in 1791.  Then, as 
now, courts excluded evidence for irrelevancy and relevant proof for 
other reasons.”285  The Court likewise, though expectedly, failed to 
define or even discuss what qualified as “fact,” nor did it delineate 
why “evidence” was somehow a non-factual issue over which the 
courts, and not the jury, possessed authority. 
The rest of the Court’s analysis consisted primarily of discussion 
concerning the costly, perverse results that would stem from prohibit-
ing the courts from rendering a judgment where they determine that 
a party has produced insufficient evidence such that no reasonable 
jury could find in his favor, and, unsurprisingly, the power of the 
courts—particularly their ability to enter judgments for a party where 
the court is unsatisfied with “the legal sufficiency” of the evidence 
supporting one side’s case.286  The Court concluded that because, 
now and at common law, a court could issue a directed verdict where 
it determined that a party failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support his or her case such that a reasonable jury could not rule in 
his or her favor, a court’s issuance of a directed verdict reflected its 
determination of a legal, rather than factual, question and was con-
sequently consistent with the Seventh Amendment.287 
The Court’s reasoning is unsatisfyingly formalistic and short-
sighted, as it ignores the practical realities and dangers engendered 
by affording the courts free reign to issue decisions on “legal ques-
 
282 Id. at 390.  The Court spent nearly the entirety of the opinion preceding this determina-
tion by detailing the factual issues in dispute. 
283 Id. at 389. 
284 Id. at 389–96. 
285 Id. at 390. 
286 Id. at 389–90, 392–93. 
287 Id. at 389–93, 396. 
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tions” that, in effect, preclude juries from deciding facts.  For in-
stance, a court may assert that because the evidence is allegedly “in-
sufficient,” no reasonable jury would rule for a particular party and, 
accordingly, issue a directed verdict preventing the jury from exercis-
ing its authority to rule on any of the case’s factual issues.  A court 
may even be tempted to issue a directed verdict if it believes further 
litigation to be wasteful or unnecessary.  The Court did not even ad-
dress this deleterious practical reality, or any others, but was seeming-
ly secure in its decision that the practice’s constitutionality was 
evinced by its analogous common law antecedents and formal con-
sistency with the Court’s holding that the jury is the trier of fact.  Ac-
cordingly, the Court noted that, concerning such abuse stemming 
from its refusal to craft “standards of proof”288 defining when courts 
may employ directed verdicts and effectively prevent juries from serv-
ing as fact-finders, “the obvious remedy is by correction on appellate 
review.”289 
This conclusion is an unconvincing one, especially given the de-
lay, costs, and uncertainty of appellate review weighed against the 
constitutional nature of the right being infringed.  Conversely, what is 
truly “obvious” is that, as illustrated by its consistent refusal to define 
or detail the trial-by-jury right, the Court is unconcerned with plain-
tiffs’ Seventh Amendment right, paving the way for procedural inno-
vations that are formally but not practically consistent with preserving 
plaintiffs’ ability to secure a jury to serve as finder of fact—such as 
MDL and FAA-supported individual arbitration agreements—to 
compel plaintiffs to relinquish their constitutional right to trial by ju-
ry.  This contravenes the “fundamental principle of American law 
that every person is entitled to his or her day in court.”290 
VI.  THE COURT SHOULD RESUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FIELD OF 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  A Critical Glance at the Court’s Conception of the Constitutional Right to 
Trial by Jury 
Consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs’ practical inability to ex-
ercise their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury should have 
sparked a discussion among the members of the federal judiciary on, 
at a minimum, two consequential issues:  whether (1) corporations’ 
 
288 Id. at 395. 
289 Id. 
290 Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966,  968 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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use of deceptively worded and inconspicuous adhesive arbitration 
agreements binding unknowing, unsophisticated consumers to indi-
vidual arbitration and (2) the courts’ employment of a pretrial cen-
tralization process that effectively compels nearly all mass tort plain-
tiffs to settle their claims are consistent with consumers’ and mass tort 
plaintiffs’ “fundamental”291 constitutional right to trial by jury.  How-
ever, the reality is that it has not.  Neither courts, nor legislators, nor 
policymakers have acknowledged the tension between binding, FAA-
supported individual arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer 
and mass tort plaintiffs’ compulsively relinquished right to trial by ju-
ry, and, instead, remain content with these practices’ formal—rather 
than practical—consistency with the Seventh Amendment.292 
A principal reason why courts, legislators, and policymakers have 
failed to address this tension is clear:  the Court’s scant Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence is extraordinarily permissive of civil pro-
cedural innovations’ impacts on the jury trial right, consistently up-
holding procedures provided that they are formally consistent with 
the Court’s undefined conception of the jury’s role as decider of “is-
sues of fact.”293  In none of its trial-by-jury cases has the Court defined 
or detailed the substance of the trial-by-jury right, the meaning of 
“fact,” or any trial-by-jury policy concerns.  Instead, it has focused al-
most exclusively on practices’ formal consistency with the Seventh 
Amendment—the idea that they leave intact some chance that a jury 
be permitted to determine issues of fact—and the expansive powers 
of the trial judge.  Operating under such a guise, the Court has up-
held nearly all procedural innovations against trial-by-jury challenges, 
signaling to legislators, policymakers, jurists, and the public that the 
constitutional right to trial by jury is not a consequential, substantive 
one, but an illusory, formal one that need not concern, in the case of 
FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, corporate defend-
ants or MDL courts. 
Consequently, we also have no operative Seventh Amendment vo-
cabulary with which to evaluate procedural innovations that impact 
 
291 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citing Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 
408, 412 (1882)). 
292 See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 670 (“[C]ourts, legislators, policymakers, and the public 
have paid very little attention to the direct tension between mandatory binding arbitra-
tion and the right to a jury trial.”).  Jurists’ and legislators’ failure to acknowledge the ten-
sion between MDL and the trial-by-jury right is evinced by the absence of scholarly, con-
gressional, and jurisprudential attention to the issue. 
293 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (identifying the 
“vital significance” in trial by jury of ensuring that issues of fact are submitted to the jury 
with instructions and guidance (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931))). 
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plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights.  Despite rendering numerous decisions 
concerning the constitutional right to trial by jury, the only pertinent 
jurisprudential proclamation in our arsenal is that juries are to de-
termine “issues of fact;” yet the Court has failed to define or detail its 
sole statement of consequence.  Thus, the Court has given us no 
method of critically evaluating whether the practical impact of any 
given procedural innovation leaves intact plaintiffs’ constitutional 
right to trial by jury, and has instead signaled that procedures are 
permissible where they formally permit plaintiffs some chance that a 
jury will be able to determine “issues of fact.” 
The question of why the Court decided to go down the path of di-
luting and ignoring plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury is a more difficult one with which to grapple.  However, this 
analysis of the Court’s right-to-trial-by-jury jurisprudence suggests a 
likely reason for the Court’s longtime retreat to its formalistic, largely 
undefined conception of the jury trial guarantee:  if the Court re-
sumed an active role in the field and afforded us an operative under-
standing of plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by jury, it would be 
forced to strike many, if not most, of the civil procedural innovations 
pervasive among federal courts today. 
Many of these procedural innovations, even aside from FAA-
supported adhesive arbitration agreements and MDL, share a tenu-
ous connection with plaintiffs’ right to trial by jury as is, one that 
would certainly deteriorate if the Court was forced to define and af-
ford substance to plaintiffs’ jury trial right.  Although not the subject 
of this Comment, these procedures undoubtedly include the motion 
to dismiss, summary judgment, and remittitur; as for their practical 
impacts on plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights, these procedures have gar-
nered substantial scholarly criticism.294 
Alternatively, the Court could attempt to craft distinctions con-
cerning the extent to which a practice may, consistent with the consti-
tutional right to trial by jury, impede plaintiffs’ access to a jury that 
would preserve many of its procedural innovations.  However, such 
an endeavor would be untenable and incredibly challenging to effec-
 
294 See Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 1890 (“The 
motion to dismiss is fast becoming the new summary judgment motion and with this 
movement, the civil jury trial continues to disappear.” (citing Thomas, Why Summary 
Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 141)); Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutional-
ity of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, supra note 8, at 734 (“[R]emittitur in fact does 
impinge the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial and is thus unconstitutional.”); Thomas, Why 
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 139–40 (“[N]o procedure similar to 
summary judgment existed under the English common law and . . . summary judgment 
violates the core principles or ‘substance’ of the English common law.”). 
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tuate, as several of these procedures, such as FAA-supported arbitra-
tion agreements and MDL, preclude most affected plaintiffs from ev-
er exercising their trial-by-jury right.  In any case, the prospects of 
striking centuries of judicial approval and practice or crafting a new 
body of trial-by-jury jurisprudence are dim, and are the likely culprits 
behind the Court’s permissive, formalistic trial-by-jury jurisprudence. 
However, upon directly confronting the tension between FAA-
supported arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer and MDL 
mass tort plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, one 
sees that the tension must be taken seriously:  the Seventh Amend-
ment’s trial-by-jury guarantee should play an operative role in con-
sumer and mass tort MDL litigation, particularly in the majority of 
cases in which unclear, inconspicuous FAA-supported adhesive arbi-
tration agreements lock unknowing, uneducated, and unsophisticat-
ed consumer plaintiffs into binding individual arbitration, preventing 
them from exercising their trial-by-jury right, and in those cases in 
which MDL’s costs, the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or nothing” ap-
proach, and the impact of bellwethers preclude mass tort plaintiffs 
from securing a trial by jury. 
The monumental importance of the Seventh Amendment to the 
Framers demands this result.295  The Framers, who remembered that 
the jury was the hard-fought “choice of the founders,”296 recognized 
the prospect that the “fundamental”297 jury trial right may, in some 
cases, be inefficient or cumbersome but nevertheless “felt that jury 
rights were of central importance,”298 and included them in the Bill of 
Rights accordingly.  To permit the Court to circumvent this critical 
constitutional right through its extraordinarily formalistic, permissive 
trial-by-jury jurisprudence is to effectively relegate the Framers’ con-
stitutional mandate, an ironic move for a Court that is seemingly so 
deeply concerned with preserving the Seventh Amendment status 
quo as of 1791. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, ignoring this tension 
and effectively marginalizing consumer and MDL mass tort plaintiffs’ 
trial-by-jury rights engenders a number of practical dangers.  Princi-
 
295 See supra Part II.A. 
296 Suja A. Thomas, Professor of Law, Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy, Key-
note Speech at the Seattle University School of Law Colloquium on the 25th Anniversary 
of the Summary Judgment Trilogy:  Reflections on Summary Judgment, Univ. of Ill. Coll. 
of Law (April 11, 2012), in 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 499, 512. 
297 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citing Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 
408, 412 (1882)). 
298 Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Tri-
al, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992). 
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pally, it threatens many of the litigant and societal interests that the 
Seventh Amendment is thought to protect, a more tangible reason 
mandating that the Court take an active role in the field of Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence by affording the trial-by-jury right a sub-
stantive meaning and properly addressing the tension between FAA-
supported arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer and MDL 
mass tort plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right. 
B.  The Practical Dangers of Marginalizing Prospective Consumer and Mass 
Tort Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment Right 
That prospective consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs lack the 
leverage that a genuine threat of trial provides is chief among the 
practical dangers sparked by the Court’s failure to address the ten-
sion between FAA-supported arbitration agreements, MDL, and af-
fected plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right.299  In the absence of such 
leverage, these plaintiffs lack the threat necessary to bring about fair-
er, more even-handed settlements from corporate defendants,300 as 
MDL settlements are negotiated with the mutual understanding that, 
per the court’s encouragement, global settlement, not a protracted 
public trial, will result, and private arbitral settlement discussions 
pursued by those few consumer plaintiffs who pursue individual bind-
ing arbitration are guided by all parties’ certainty that a public trial 
cannot occur.301  Consequently, corporate defendants have less incen-
 
299 See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (“The significance of the reliance on settlement to re-
solve mass tort litigation is twofold.  First, individual litigants will not have the leverage 
that a realistic threat of trial provides.” (citing Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence 
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 607 
(1997))). 
300 See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:  Restoring A Realis-
tic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011) (“Without the realistic pos-
sibility of a trial, settlements in large measure reflect and discount the costs of discovery 
and trial.  As a result, some plaintiffs receive less than the value of their cases if tried on 
the merits . . . .” (citing ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL, 40–68, 
112–35 (2009)); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances 
Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 989 n.112 (1988) (“The backdrop of trial—and the likely 
outcome there—is a significant influence on the negotiation-settlement process.” (citing 
Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t Know (And 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 32–
34 (1983))); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 
192–93 (1987) (explaining the economics behind the settlement-encouraging effect that 
the backdrop of potential litigation has on settlement negotiations); Steven Shavell, The 
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 575, 607 (1997) (“[T]he most important justification for . . . trials is . . . to 
provide victims with the threat necessary to induce settlements.”). 
301 See supra Part IV; supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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tive to offer consumer and mass tort plaintiffs the sizable settlements 
that they would have considered if negotiations occurred against the 
backdrop of a public, costly, and protracted trial.302  This is not only 
antidemocratic,303 but it has a propensity to produce fewer, smaller 
settlements that may inadequately compensate consumer plaintiffs 
and mass tort victims.304 
Moreover, arbitrations’ and MDL’s reliance on settlement and 
private arbitral proceedings, respectively, are also consequential.  
When binding arbitration and MDL are employed, the twin princi-
ples behind the right to trial by jury, democracy and impartiality, are 
violated.305 
These practices violate the principles of democracy underpinning 
the trial-by-jury right because, when arbitration or MDL is employed, 
arbitrators or lawyers—not jurors, whose verdicts are thought to con-
stitute the exercise of democracy within our judicial system—reach 
settlement or determine liability privately, with limited judicial over-
sight, and records of their discussions or proceedings are inaccessible 
to the public.306  Consequently, these practices are practically incon-
sistent with the jury trial right’s democracy principle.307  Although 
seemingly intangible, the antidemocratic nature of these practices is 
consequential because, “[s]ince the founding of our country, trials in 
open court resulting in decisions by either a judge or jury have been 
thought to be constitutive of American democracy.”308  The democra-
 
302 See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
303 See infra note 306 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
305 See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (“The significance of the reliance on settlement to re-
solve mass tort litigation is twofold . . . . [T]he current regime violates both of the princi-
ples that animate the right to a jury trial.”). 
306 See 2 WILLIAM M. HANNAY, LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, § 70:15 (2013) (“[A]rbitration 
is a private process.  Unlike court proceedings, arbitration proceedings do not become 
part of the public record and are generally not public events.”); Burbank & Subrin, supra 
note 300, at 401 (“Since the founding of our country, trials in open court resulting in de-
cisions by either a judge or a jury have been thought to be constitutive of American de-
mocracy . . . . This right to be heard, the core of due process of law, has been integral to 
democratic thought and institutions at least since the English Magna Carta in the thir-
teenth century.” (citing BURNS, supra note 300, at 40–68, 112–35); Lahav, supra note 156, 
at 593 (“[J]uries do not determine damages in settled cases and individual plaintiffs are 
not ordinarily involved in negotiations.  Instead, lawyers (in some cases with judicial over-
sight) determine damages awards privately.  Settlement is undemocratic because lawyers 
reach settlement privately with limited judicial or client oversight.”); Jack B. Weinstein, 
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 511 (1994)) (“[I]t is almost 
impossible to settle many mass tort cases without a secrecy agreement.”). 
307 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
308 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 300, at 401 (citing BURNS, supra note 306, at 40–68, 112–
35). 
282 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
cy principle ensures that “each of us has had the opportunity to see 
that the laws our representatives have chosen to replace the state of 
nature are more than empty promises (or threats),”309 so their cur-
tailment by FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL is not a 
phenomenon to be ignored. 
Furthermore, these practices contravene the trial-by-jury right’s 
impartiality underpinning by supporting bias and facilitating corrup-
tion, as MDL’s decision makers—lawyers and judges—as well as arbi-
tration’s decision makers—individual arbitrators—often have system-
ic interests at odds with those of the individual plaintiffs.310  For 
instance, MDL judges have “the interest of reducing their dockets 
and may become inured to the plight of plaintiffs.”311  MDL lawyers, 
too, often have their own interests that conflict with those of plain-
tiffs; for instance, these lawyers have been known to “be tempted to 
trade some clients off against others to resolve large numbers of cases 
collectively.”312  Likewise, because corporations will attempt to select 
an arbitrator who is “at least unconsciously biased toward the compa-
ny,”313 arbitral decision makers are often biased toward corporate in-
terests and, consequently, decrease plaintiffs’ potential payout, where 
they choose to find corporate liability at all.314  To realize this end, 
corporations’ adhesive arbitration agreements “frequently provide 
that the arbitrator shall be a current or former manager from the 
company’s field of business.”315  Expectedly, consumer efforts to prove 
bias and overturn partial arbitrators’ decisions have been met with 
judicial opposition, as federal courts have repeatedly held that even 
the selection of a manager from a particular industry does not consti-
tute evidence of bias.316 
This bias and partiality is not only repugnant to the democracy 
and impartiality principles underlying our Seventh Amendment 
right, but, as they are facilitative of corrupt decision making, they 
 
309 Id. 
310 See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (citing Weinstein, supra note 306, at 521–23) (explaining 
the conflicts of interest present among MDL attorneys and judges). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. (citing Weinstein, supra note 306, at 521–23). 
313 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684 (1996). 
314 See id. (“Large companies will also attempt to select a decision maker likely to decrease 
their likely payout.”). 
315 Id. (citing Bakri v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. CV92-34876 SVW(K), 1992 WL 464125, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992)). 
316 See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)). 
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stand as measurable impediments to the fair adjudication of victims’ 
and consumer plaintiffs’ claims. 
Furthermore, FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL 
are also obstacles to the development of legal and normative contract 
and mass tort standards.  Legal and normative standards concerning 
negligence, evidence, punitive damages, and other issues at play in 
contract and mass tort actions, the subject of most FAA-supported ar-
bitral and mass tort MDL actions, develop “based on the experience 
of trials,”317 through litigants’ successes and failures before a judge 
and jury.318  The loss of contract and mass tort trials stemming from 
FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL “removes this 
grounding experience, leaving the standards open.”319  However, we 
need trials to ground contracts’ and mass torts’ legal and “normative 
standards—to make them sufficiently clear that persons can abide by 
them in planning their affairs.”320  Consequently, the repercussions of 
the absence of trials’ “standard-setting effect[s],”321 although likely 
unseen and intangible today, will result in a profound legal and nor-
mative gap tomorrow, largely to the detriment of those consumer and 
mass tort plaintiffs fortunate enough to exercise their jury trial right. 
Additionally, FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, by 
nullifying the threat of an individual or class-based jury trial, also re-
duce the incentive for corporate defendants to minimize reckless be-
havior. 
Corporate defendants employing adhesive, FAA-supported arbi-
tration agreements or before an MDL court know they do not need 
to be concerned with a protracted, public, individual or class-based 
trial, which scholars and jurists have found play a vital role in deter-
ring corporate wrongdoing.322  They can, instead, rest assured know-
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318 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 300, at 401–02 (“[L]egal norms need community input 
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320 Id. at 1423. 
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to . . . deter wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings.” (citing David Rosenberg, Decoupling 
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ing that, if victims or consumer plaintiffs seek to hold them responsi-
ble, the most they reasonably have to fear is a private settlement.  Be-
cause arbitration occurs privately and mass tort MDL attorneys cloak 
settlement discussions and discovery with comprehensive protective 
orders, arbitral and MDL proceedings’ findings are not subject to 
public scrutiny, so the public will never know whether the victims’ or 
consumer plaintiffs’ allegations are meritorious and whether the de-
fendants truly engaged in reckless, harmful, or illegal behavior,323 
measurably diminishing corporations’ motivation to curb such behav-
ior.324  Consequently, not only is the status quo’s absence of trials 
harmful to future plaintiffs, victims, and society at large, but it con-
travenes a primary principle underlying America’s civil justice system:  
our civil justice system seeks not only to compensate the victim, but 
also to “deter companies from harming in the first place.”325 
Finally, corporations are able to use adhesive, FAA-supported arbi-
tration agreements as a claim-suppression device, inhibiting consum-
ers from seeking legal adjudication and redress for the wrongful acts 
undertaken by corporate defendants.  Evidence not only shows that 
mandatory arbitration stifles consumer plaintiffs’ claims,326 but also 
that FAA-supported adhesive class arbitration waivers, by effectively 
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1871, 1906 n.62 (2002))). 
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barring consumers from securing class actions, serve as perhaps the 
ultimate, most potent claim-suppression device available.327 
By banning consumer class actions and funneling consumers into 
binding, individual arbitration, class arbitration waivers make disput-
ing individual consumer cases uneconomical.328  Consumer class ac-
tions are dominated by those cases in which corporations use low-
dollar-value rip-offs that engender substantial revenues because they 
are practiced on a wide scale.329  However, by prohibiting the aggrega-
tion of such low-value claims, adhesive class arbitration waivers pro-
duce a reality in which it is uneconomical for individual consumer 
plaintiffs to expend the substantial time and resources called for by 
an individual arbitration action against a corporate defendant over a 
low-value claim.330  As a result, consumers are often compelled to 
permit their individual, low-value claims to go entirely unremitted.331  
This not only forces consumers to internalize the costs stemming 
from corporations’ wrongdoing, but, in effect, permits corporations 
to “simply opt out of exposure to collective litigation,”332 a result not 
only repugnant to the ideals underlying plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury right, 
but also one that is “no more defensible than a system in which cor-
porations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to federal an-
titrust, securities, or civil rights laws”333 at all. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Court’s repeated proclamations deeming plaintiffs’ 
Seventh Amendment trial-by-jury right “justly dear to the American 
people”334 and “an object of deep interest and solicitude,”335 the Court 
has, in practice, disregarded this right entirely, as analysis reveals that 
it has unconditionally permitted procedures, such as FAA-supported 
arbitration agreements and MDL, to compel and coerce consumer 
and mass tort plaintiffs into relinquishing their right to trial by jury. 
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Though the Court has not explicitly approved of either procedure 
or the resultant diminution of plaintiffs’ constitutional right, the 
Court has rubber-stamped each through its decision to effectively exit 
the field of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Its formalistic, per-
missive trial-by-jury jurisprudence affords the constitutional right no 
meaning, substance, or policy backing, signaling to the public, feder-
al courts, and legislators that plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by 
jury is not a substantive, consequential protection, but a minor formal 
requirement that can be easily overridden by a procedure’s nominal 
consistency with the vague notion that it permits the jury some 
chance at rendering a verdict on “issues of fact.”336 
The Court’s decision to exit the field of Seventh Amendment ju-
risprudence is a profoundly problematic, untenable one.  There are 
no “exception[s] to the jury trial right.”337  The jury was not just the 
“efficient choice of the founders;”338 the Founders considered the 
right to a jury trial to be “a central figure in the administration of jus-
tice.”339  Accordingly, the Framers, whose interpretations the Court 
ironically claims to honor, recognized the pitfalls of the jury-trial 
right, but “nevertheless tenaciously insisted upon its inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights.”340  More tangibly, the practical dangers of marginaliz-
ing consumer and mass tort plaintiffs’ constitutional trial-by-jury 
rights are manifold, as the absence of jury trials threatens the very lit-
igant and societal interests the Seventh Amendment is thought to 
protect.  Thus, that returning to the field of Seventh Amendment ju-
risprudence will be a daunting task likely calling for the Court to 
overturn several of its past decisions is an unavailing justification for 
the Court’s continued failure to adequately define, detail, or protect 
plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by jury. 
Consequently, we—scholars, policymakers, legislators, judges, law-
yers, and students alike—cannot remain idle onlookers in the field of 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Each step we permit the Court 
and corporate defendants to take in permitting and employing pro-
cedures inconsistent with plaintiffs’ practical ability to be heard by a 
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jury is a step toward a judicial administrative method of handling le-
gal disputes, a step toward a system in which the right to a civil jury 
trial is not a constitutional right to be exercised by plaintiffs, but a 
devalued, neglected relic of the past.  As is illustrated by its striking 
willingness to accept modern civil procedural innovations’ impacts on 
the jury-trial right through its permissive, formalistic Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court is unlikely to affect change in 
the absence of an externally supplied impetus to do so.  Thus, any 
Court-ordered solution to this constitutional dilemma will stem from 
our actions—scholars’ critical focus on the tension between modern 
civil procedural innovations and plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights, policy-
makers,’ legislators’, and judges’ directives and holdings concerning 
plaintiffs’ access to juries, lawyers’ efforts to convince the Courts to 
focus and act on this issue, and students’ activism on behalf of those 
prospective plaintiffs unable to exercise their constitutional rights.  
Accordingly, only by taking such action can we vindicate the contin-
ued vitality of the Seventh Amendment and the interests it protects 
and ensure that neither FAA-supported arbitration, MDL, nor any 
other procedural innovation effectively, as many corporate defend-
ants would certainly like them to, “relegat[e] the Seventh Amend-
ment to insignificant words on a page.”341 
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